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WEN-CHEN SHIH*
Energy Security, GATT/WTO, and
Regional Agreements
ABSTRACT
Ensuring a steady supply of energy remains a priority for every na-
tion’s energy policymaking because most countries import energy re-
sources. Therefore, trade in energy—in particular the export policies
of major energy resources exporting countries—plays a crucial role
in energy security planning. This article questions whether the legal
principles of non-discrimination and prohibition on quantitative re-
strictions under the World Trade Organization (WTO) assist WTO
Members in achieving energy security and, if so, why some WTO
Members negotiate regional agreements with very strong energy
connections, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and
the Energy Charter Treaty. Does this imply that the WTO’s role in
energy security will be increasingly diminished and replaced by re-
gional agreements? While this article finds that export controls
under these regional agreements are more attuned to cater to the
energy security needs of energy importing countries, this article con-
cludes that the WTO will not, and cannot, be substituted by regional
agreements in the context of energy security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy is the driving force behind every nation’s economic activi-
ties. How to ensure steady supplies of energy remains a top priority of
every nation’s energy policies. Nonrenewable energy resources such as
coal, oil, and natural gas are located in only a handful of countries or
regions around the world, resulting in a situation where most countries
are dependent upon imported energy resources.1 Therefore, policies con-
cerning energy security and energy supply increasingly take into ac-
count international trade in energy—in particular, export policies of the
Editors’ note: The Natural Resources Journal was not able to verify the foreign language
sources used in this article.
* Wen-chen Shih, Associate Professor of Law, Department of International Business,
National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan.
1. See 2008 Key World Energy Statistics, IEA REPORTS 11, 13, available at http://www.
iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2008/key_stats_2008.pdf. For example, according to the sta-
tistics of the International Energy Agency (IEA), the top 10 crude oil producing countries
accounted for 61.6 percent of world crude oil production in 2007 and their combined ex-
ports account for 65.32 percent of total world export in 2006. Id. The top 10 natural gas
producing countries accounted for 64.5 percent of world natural gas production in 2007,
and their combined export accounted for 75.57 percent of total world export in 2007. Id.
433
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major energy resources-producing countries. Only two out of the top 10
oil-producing countries—Russia and Iran—are not yet Members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO).2 In the 12-member Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), only four members—Alge-
ria, Iran, Iraq, and Libya—are not WTO Members. Nevertheless, all these
oil-producing countries, which are not yet WTO Members, are currently
applying for accession to the WTO.3 Does this imply that international
trade in energy, in particular in energy resources, will be subject to the
non-discrimination and trade liberalization principles embodied in the
WTO? Does this further imply that, as a result, WTO Members depen-
dent on imported energy can achieve their policy goals of energy secur-
ity and energy supply?
On another front, it has been noted that the multilateral trading
system (MTS) under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) mainly addresses market access issues, rather than access to sup-
plies.4 In addition, industrialized countries have realized that the success
of OPEC in using supply restriction measures to raise oil prices in the
1970s demonstrates how ill-equipped the MTS was to deal with
problems of access to key energy supplies such as crude oil. Therefore,
the International Energy Agency (IEA) was established by industrialized
countries in 1974 to respond to the oil crisis and national policies by rais-
ing energy efficiency and diversifying energy supply, and was adopted
by governments sensitive to energy security issues. More importantly,
some countries began to negotiate and conclude regional agreements
with very strong energy content—such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Such
regional agreements have one characteristic in common, they try to “re-
verse the traditional GATT emphasis on access to market in favor of ac-
cess to supplies.”5 Does this trend imply that the role of the MTS,
established by the GATT/WTO, will be increasingly marginalized and
2. According to the 2008 Key World Energy Statistics, the top 10 oil-producing coun-
tries are Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Iran, China, Mexico, Canada, Venezuela,
Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates. Id. at 11. As for the membership of the WTO, please
visit the “members and observers” section of the official WTO website at: http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
3.  For information on the OPEC countries, please visit the official OPEC website at
http://www.opec.org/aboutus. As for the status of countries that are in the WTO acces-
sion negotiation, please visit the “accession” section of the official WTO website at http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm.
4. Melaku Geboye Desta et al., The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the
World Trade Organization, and Regional Trade Agreement, 37 J. OF WORLD TRADE 523, 532
(2003).
5. Desta et al., supra note 4, at 538–39. R
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replaced by such regional agreements with regard to energy trade and
energy security concerns?
These central themes are examined throughout the article. Part II
begins by briefly introducing the concept of energy security—in particu-
lar the importance of the supply of energy resources—followed by de-
tailed analysis regarding the different dimensions of energy trade and
the corresponding provisions under the GATT/WTO. Export control
regulations will be identified as the crucial component of energy security
for those WTO Members that rely on imported energy resources. Export
control regulations, such as export tariff, quantitative restrictions on ex-
port, and exceptions clauses, under the GATT/WTO will be examined in
Part III to determine whether such regulations can assist WTO Members
in ensuring a steady supply of energy resources. Part IV will then focus
on two regional agreements with strong energy content—NAFTA and
the ECT. This part will analyze the agreements’ relevant provisions on
export control and transit, and compare these provisions with those
under the GATT/WTO in order to identify the best approach to energy
security through trade policies. Lastly, Part V offers some conclusions
and suggestions.
II. ENERGY SECURITY AND ENERGY TRADE
UNDER THE GATT/WTO
A. Energy Security
Energy security is a multi-faceted issue. Energy security is assured
when a nation can reliably, economically, environmentally, and safely
deliver energy in quantities sufficient to support growing economy and
defense needs. Such a goal requires policies that “support expansion of
all elements of the energy supply and delivery infrastructure, with suffi-
cient storage and generating reserves, diversity and redundancy, to meet
the demands of economic growth.”6 Energy security issues at the interna-
tional level embrace a set of issues ranging from physical security of per-
sonnel and of infrastructure, and security of supply against disruption,
to security of a stable legal and political climate for energy investment
and trade.7 In recent years, environmental issues relating to energy use—
for example, the emissions of greenhouse gases from the burning of fos-
6. U.S. Energy Association, National Energy Security Post 9/11, 7 (2002), available at
http://www.usea.org/Publications/Documents/USEAReport.pdf.
7. Catherine Redgwell, International Energy Security, in ENERGY SECURITY: MANAGING
RISK IN A DYNAMIC LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT, 17 (Barry Barton et al., ed.,
2005).
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sil fuels—have also become part of the energy policy concerns.8 Such a
dimension has also been incorporated into energy security issues. For
example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its World
Energy Assessment report defines energy security as “a term that applies
to the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient
quantities, and at affordable prices, without unacceptable or irreversible
impact on the environment.”9
In the global marketplace, a country’s energy and economic secur-
ity are directly related to its supply of energy.10 Thus, “energy security at
its simplest means the security of energy supply.”11 However, key con-
cerns for energy security issues can be quite different for countries with
different levels of development and natural resources endowment. For
most of the industrialized countries, one crucial aspect of energy security
is the supply of oil and natural gas at reasonable prices. For developing
countries without natural or energy resources, the following dimensions
are their key energy security concerns: (1) access to sufficient primary
energy sources to generate electricity in various sectors; (2) obtain
enough oil for the transportation sector; and (3) provide, in the short and
medium term, access to traditional fuels for the poor before transferring
to a modern energy system.12 For developing countries with abundant
energy resources, such as Saudi Arabia and some OPEC countries, the
most important energy security concern might, on the other hand, re-
quire “unfettered access to the downstream petroleum sectors of the
United States and other major industrial countries via exports of crude
oil, products, and capital for further investment in refining and product
marketing.”13 As a result, governments inevitably adopt very diverse
8. According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) in February 2007, “Most of the observed increase in globally aver-
aged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, 10 (2007), available at http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.
edu/wg1/docs/WG1AR4_SPM_Approved_05Feb.pdf.
9. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT: OVERVIEW 2004 UP-
DATE, 42, (2004), available at http://www.undp.org/energy/docs/WEAOU_full.pdf; see
Black, Alexander J., Environmental Impact Assessment and Energy Export, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 799 (1994).
10. Stacey L. Middleton, How the Petroleum Addict Negotiates with the Dealer: Challenges
to the Bush Administration’s North American Energy Policy, 11 CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. L.
177, 180 (2003).
11. Robert Pritchard, Global Energy Security and Middle East Oil, 2006 INT’L ENERGY L. &
TAX’N REV. 13, 13 (2006).
12. Ambuj D. Sagar et al., Climate Change, Energy and Developing Countries, 7 VT. J. OF
ENVTL. L. 4, Part III (2005).
13. Edward L. Morse, A Rational International Petroleum Regime for the 1990s, 27 TULSA
L.J. 479, 491 (1992).
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policies to implement their respective energy security goals depending
on their different energy security concerns. Nevertheless, as has been
noted in the introduction, the majority of countries depend on imported
energy resources. This phenomenon highlights the indispensable role of
international trade in energy, in particular export control of major energy
resources countries, as it is closely linked with the policy goal of security
of supply.
B. Energy Trade and the GATT/WTO
1. Dimensions and Content of Energy Trade
Energy trade is also a multi-faceted issue that covers a wide range
of issues ranging from trade in goods to trade in services relating to en-
ergy. Various dimensions of energy trade will depend on different as-
pects of energy—its production, generation, transmission, conversion,
storage, distribution, utilization, consumption, etc. For example, the pro-
duction of energy entails converting various types of energy resources
into consumer goods, such as electricity and petroleum. This process in-
volves, first of all, export and import of nonrenewable energy resources,
which consist mostly of mineral fuels such as coal, crude oil, liquefied
natural gas, natural gas (via pipelines or transmission lines), etc. Renew-
able energy (natural energy) cannot be traded in itself. However, usable
energy converted from renewable energy into consumer products, such
as electricity from solar cells, can be traded internationally. In addition,
various types of equipments and services required from the production
stage—prospecting and exploration—through the conversion stage, to
the final stage of utilization and consumption can also be traded. Thus,
energy trade not only covers the most traditional dimension of trade in
mineral fuels but also incorporates various trades in goods and services
that are associated with different dimensions of energy.
As previously noted, energy security concerns vary among differ-
ent countries. This, in turn, reflects the diverse dimensions and features
of energy trade in different countries. In addition to the most typical and
traditional trade policies of tariff and non-tariff measures, investment
policies and industrial policies have also been taken into consideration in
the overall framework and design of international energy trade concerns
by countries with different levels of development and natural resources
endowments. As mineral fuels are still the dominant energy resources
for most countries, revenue from export of mineral fuels for developing
countries with abundant mineral fuels resources (such as the OPEC
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countries) continue to be the most important source of national income.14
Determining how to secure market access for their mineral fuels is, thus,
of primary importance for such countries.15
Furthermore, in the process of industrialization, such developing
countries not only need to address new market access issues for their
value-added products, like petrochemical products, but they also need to
adopt industrial policies to protect their domestic industries, such as the
refinery and petrochemical sectors.16 Investment policies to attract for-
eign capital and technologies in resources exploration and in the process
of industrialization can also be crucial in such developing countries.
From this perspective, developed countries with advanced technologies
will be interested in how to secure market access and opportunities in
these developing countries. Their main concern will focus on whether
developing countries with mineral resources will allow private or for-
eign participation in the exploration and exploitation of mineral re-
sources and whether the legal systems, concerning direct foreign
investment, in these countries can provide adequate protection to inves-
tors. For countries that depend on imported energy resources, their pri-
mary concerns will be to ensure that their supply of energy resources
will not be affected or disturbed by export control measures adopted by
the countries exporting energy resources and to ensure the safety and
freedom in the transportation of those energy resources. For countries
with rich nonrenewable resources that seek to develop their resources to
become less import-dependent, industrial and investment policies that
establish and protect relevant industries, on the one hand, and selec-
tively attract foreign capital and technologies, on the other hand, will be
their main energy trade concern. Similarly, from this perspective, devel-
oped countries with advanced technologies will, again, be interested in
securing market access and opportunities in these nonrenewable re-
source-rich countries.
In the context of energy security, a steady supply of energy re-
mains a top priority. Not surprisingly, issues relating to energy supply—
including a diversified source of imported energy resources, stability in
their main supplying regions, and safety of transportation—turn out to
be the major concern of energy trade for countries that depend on im-
ported energy resources. Therefore, energy trade in the context of sup-
14. See IEA, 2006 Key World Energy Statistics, IEA REPORTS, at 19, available at http://
www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/key2006.pdf. For example, hydropower only ac-
counted for 16.1 percent of the total sources of energy in 2004. Id.
15. For example, import tariffs and internal taxes and charges on the import of mineral
fuels should not be raised to the level that might reduce the income of such exporting
countries.
16. The problem of tariff escalation is a good case in point.
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plying energy resources remains the most significant policy goal of
energy security for energy importing countries.
In order to determine whether the MTS and its trade rules estab-
lished by the GATT/WTO adequately provide a legal framework for its
Members with different energy trade and energy security concerns, the
GATT/WTO’s provisions relating to the diverse policy concerns and
dimensions of energy trade must be analyzed.
2. GATT/WTO, Energy Trade, and Energy Security
Energy goods and energy resources are not subject to different or
special treatment under the GATT 1947. In other words, regulations re-
lating to trade in goods under the GATT are, in principle, applicable to
trade in energy resources. However, international energy trade has been
little developed in the debate or the jurisprudence of international eco-
nomic and trade law. The main reason is that it was only in the 1990s
that “privatization, followed by liberalization of former national energy
monopolies, has opened up increasingly competitive national and then
regional markets in energy.”17 In addition, take the most important en-
ergy resource—oil—as an example. Most of the oil fields were under the
control of the American, British, Dutch, or French multilateral enter-
prises back in the 1940s when the GATT was under negotiation. As these
countries would have liked to avoid tensions over the control of re-
sources, they seemed to implicitly exclude the most strategic interna-
tional commodity—crude oil—from the GATT negotiations. In any case,
the main oil-exporting countries were non-Contracting Parties to the
GATT at the time.18 A “gentlemen’s agreement,” perhaps, was in place in
the GATT’s early history to continue excluding issues relating to trade
and price of crude oil from the GATT framework.19 After the oil crisis in
the 1970s, however, the United States and other industrialized countries
attempted to include the subject of export restrictions in the Tokyo
Round. Nevertheless, this attempt failed as objections were raised by
many countries.20 During the Uruguay Round of negotiations, export
control measures on oil began to surface again as several petroleum-pro-
ducing countries—Mexico and Venezuela—were in the process of acces-
17. See Thomas W. Walde & Andreas J. Gunst, International Energy Trade and Access to
Energy Network, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 191 (2002). Only electricity and natural gases are
referred to in this article; however, the prevailing industrial development in the energy
sector is quite similar to trade in other types of energy resources.
18. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AGREEMENTS, PETRO-
LEUM AND ENERGY POLICIES, 14–15 (2000), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
itcdtsb9_en.pdf.
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id.
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sion to the GATT 1947.21 After the Uruguay Round, the only four non-
WTO Members in OPEC—Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and Libya—had either ap-
plied or were in the process of accession to the WTO.22
It seems that, when compared to the GATT 1947, the international
trade in petroleum could be controlled more effectively by multilateral
trade rules within the WTO. New disciplines, such as trade in services,
have also been incorporated into the WTO. These factors seem to bring
out the conclusion that multilateral trade rules under the GATT 1994 and
the WTO can play a more significant role in regulating international
trade in energy than the GATT 1947. If this is the case, then why do some
WTO Members actively seek and conclude regional agreements with
strong energy content to regulate their trade in energy? Before embark-
ing on this query, this section will briefly analyze relevant provisions
under the GATT/WTO that might affect international trade in energy.
One of the characteristics of the energy industry is that, tradition-
ally, the industry has not distinguished between energy goods and en-
ergy services. The failure to distinguish between energy goods and
energy services could be due to the market structure of the energy sector
which, until recently, was dominated by state-owned, vertically inte-
grated suppliers that performed all energy-related economic activities—
including the production and distribution of energy products.23 Such an
integrated structure has been broken down in some countries by priva-
tizing certain public suppliers and introducing partial or full competition
in the energy sector.24 Such trends also lead to the identification of en-
ergy services as distinct from energy goods.25
For WTO Members, imports and exports of all types of energy
resources need to comply with various GATT 1994 provisions on tariffs,
non-tariff measures, and non-discrimination principles. For resources ex-
porting WTO Members, the following measures taken by importing
WTO Members will affect their export earning: (1) whether the import
tariffs on energy resources are bounded under Article II of the GATT
1994; and (2) whether such resources are subject to discriminatory taxes
21. Id. at 15–20.
22. Algeria applied to the GATT on June 16, 1987. Iran applied to the WTO on July 19,
1996. Iraq applied to the WTO on September 30, 2004. Libya applied to the WTO on June
10, 2004. For the status of countries that are in the WTO accession negotiation, please visit
the “accession” section of the official WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_
e/acc_e/acc_e.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
23. See World Trade Organization, Energy Services: Background Note by the Secreta-
riat, ¶ 3 (1998) [hereinafter WTO Secretariat].
24. Id.
25. Id.
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or measures.26 For resources-importing WTO Members, on the other
hand, the following measures taken by exporting Members will affect the
security of supply on energy resources: (1) whether export tariffs and
other charges can be raised; and (2) whether export restriction measures
can be adopted at will and unpredictably. For WTO Members that
largely depend on imported energy, increasing energy demand and the
inelasticity of nonrenewable energy resources supply cause those Mem-
bers to question whether export control regulations under the GATT/
WTO can provide energy stability and security by ensuring that the sup-
ply and trade in energy, especially energy resources, will not be affected
by discriminatory measures of the exporting Members.
In addition to the above-mentioned export-control regulations,
freedom of transit as provided under Article V of the GATT 1994 is also
of great importance in energy trade—in particular for trade in those
types of energy resources (e.g., natural gases) that require pipelines and
transmission lines. The question of whether Article V applies to transit of
energy has, however, been debated and is not yet settled.27 Despite its
potential importance, Article V has played a very limited role in cross-
border energy transit for the following two reasons. First, many of the
states where transit problems occur, such as Ukraine, are not yet WTO
Members. Second, a large number of important pipelines and transmis-
sion lines have been under the ownership and control of state-owned
companies or monopolized private companies, and Article V has not yet
been developed into an effective obligation for WTO Members to ensure
that these state-owned companies comply with transit obligations.28
A prevailing practice concerning energy resources is the so-called
dual pricing or two-tiered pricing scheme in which the domestic prices
in resource-rich countries remain substantially lower than the world
market price.29 By imposing high export tariffs or other export controls,
resource-rich countries maintain a below-world-market domestic price of
energy resources with an aim of ensuring a sufficient and cheap supply
of raw materials for its domestic manufacturing industries. In addition to
GATT/WTO regulations on export controls to deal with such schemes,
another possible set of regulations might be those concerning subsi-
dies—e.g., does dual pricing represent a subsidy by the exporting coun-
26. For oil-exporting countries, high consumption taxes and excise taxes imposed on
cars and other petrochemical products can seriously affect the benefits of exports. U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 27 & n. 27. R
27. See Pascal Laffont, An Energy Charter Protocol on Transit, 2003 INT’L ENERGY L. &
TAX’N REV. 239, 240.
28. Walde & Gunst, supra note 17, at 211–12. R
29. Stephen J. Powell & John D. McInerney, International Energy Trade and the Unfair
Trade Laws, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 339, Part 1.1. (1989).
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try that must comply with GATT/WTO’s regulations? The United States
and some other industrialized countries attempted to bring up such is-
sues in the Uruguay Round, which failed to address such issues because
a consensus was difficult to reach.30 Interestingly, there has been no dis-
pute over these practices under the GATT 1947 and the WTO. However,
as the world market price of nonrenewable energy resources increases,
the question as to whether the two-tiered pricing scheme becomes more
trade distorting and controversial and whether the Agreement on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Measures is capable, or even eligible, to tackle
such controversy remain to be seen.31
In addition to issues on subsidies, energy resources or related pe-
trochemical products might be subject to anti-dumping investigation in
the importing countries. According to WTO documents, there are a num-
ber of anti-dumping actions affecting the petrochemical sector.32 For ex-
ample, in June of 1999, the U.S. Department of Commerce received a
petition from the Committee to Save Domestic Oil, Inc. (SDO), a group of
American independent producers from the American Midwest, alleging
market dumping of crude oil by Venezuela, Mexico, Iraq, and Saudi Ara-
bia.33 The petition was dismissed on August 16, 1999, on the ground that
SDO did not have sufficient industry support to continue the investiga-
tion.34 Nevertheless—as provided under the “Agreement on Implemen-
tation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,”
known as the “Anti-dumping Agreement”35—this incidence has signifi-
cant implications on exporting countries as their trade activities could be
scrutinized under the WTO anti-dumping discipline.
As has been mentioned, economic activities in the energy sector
have traditionally been left to state-owned companies or monopolized
private enterprises. Despite privatization and liberalization that took
place in the 1990s, most resource-rich countries maintain state monopo-
lies to control the export of energy resources. For example, “the top ten
30. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 15–20.
31.  For a more detailed discussion on whether dual pricing measures are consistent
with the definition of “subsidy” under the Agreement on Subsidy and Countervailing Mea-
sures, whether importing countries can impose countervailing duties, and the future devel-
opment of dual pricing policies, please see U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 18, at 29–35.
32. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 36.
33. William C. Smith, Save Domestic Oil, Inc.’s Crude Oil Market Dumping Petition: Do-
mestic and International Political Considerations, 8 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 147, 147 (2000).
34.  For detailed discussion and analysis concerning this dispute, see id.
35. See World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-
adp_01_e.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
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oil companies in 2003 in terms of reserves are state monopolies.”36 Such
national oil companies and governments now take almost 80 percent of
industry profits.37 Thus, Article XVII of the GATT 1994 on state trading
enterprises and relevant jurisprudence, developed via dispute cases,
could also be relevant to international trade in energy because of state-
owned oil companies. A related issue concerns the conduct of interna-
tional commodity organizations—such as OPEC—or agreements that are
formed to control world market prices for commodities, and whether
such conduct represents unfair competition.38 Take OPEC as an example.
Two cases alleging violation of U.S. antitrust laws were brought against
OPEC in late 1978 by a U.S. labor union and, again, in April 2000 by a
U.S. company. Both of these cases were dismissed pursuant to the “act of
state” doctrine and on procedural grounds, respectively.39 Such inci-
dences demonstrate the importance of competition law in energy trade.
However, competition law is not yet part of the legal framework under
the GATT/WTO and was not addressed under the 2004 Doha Round
negotiation.40
As mentioned previously, domestic markets that used to be closed
to foreign competition began to be liberalized after privatization and lib-
eralization took place in the energy sector. Part II.B.1 of this article also
pointed out that energy trade encompasses new market access for tech-
nologically advanced countries in terms of foreign investment opportu-
nities, as well as in the energy-services sectors. Hence, in addition to
provisions on trade in goods, regulations under the WTO on trade re-
lated investment activities and trade in services also affects trade in en-
ergy. For the former, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (the TRIMs Agreement) seems to be most relevant. The TRIMs
Agreement mainly prohibits WTO Members from adopting trade balanc-
ing or domestic content requirements in their domestic investment mea-
sures in order to comply with the principles of national treatment and
36. Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Traditional Petroleum-based Economy: An “Eventful” Fu-
ture, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 505, 544 (2005–06).
37. Id. at 544–545.
38. Negotiation on export monopoly was included in Article 31.1 of the Havana Char-
ter, but later disappeared when the Soviet Union decided to withdraw from the Interna-
tional Trade Organization. Michael Rom, Export Controls in GATT, 18 J. WORLD TRADE LAW
125, 136 (1984). For the legal status and operation of various types of export cartels in the
United States, Germany, European Union and Japan, and how they interact with trade and
competition policies, see generally Ulrich Immenga, Export Cartels and Voluntary Export Re-
straints Between Trade and Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 93 (1995).
39. See Desta et al., supra note 4, at 541–43 (analyzing these two legal disputes). R
40.  Visit the World Trade Organization’s website, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm., for an introduction to the work regarding trade and com-
petition policy of the WTO.
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the prohibition on quantitative restrictions.41 Other crucial elements in
the overall regulations concerning foreign direct investment are, how-
ever, not provided under the TRIMs Agreement. For technologically ad-
vanced WTO Members that seek investment opportunities in resource-
rich countries, the TRIMs Agreement under the WTO does not seem to
provide an adequate legal framework. Recourses to domestic legislations
regulating direct foreign investment or bilateral/regional—or even
sectoral—investment protection agreements might be necessary to pro-
vide more legal certainty in this aspect of energy trade.
For trade in energy services, the most relevant regulations under
the WTO are the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and its
Annexes. Whether energy, in the form of electricity, should be catego-
rized as a good or a service has been subject to academic debate.42 Apart
from the element of uncertainty regarding electricity, it seems generally
accepted that the production of primary and secondary energy is subject
to the GATT 1994, as the production service is incorporated in the value
of the good produced. Transportation and distribution of energy, if pro-
vided independently, might constitute services under the GATS. Con-
struction, engineering, and consulting services could also be used in the
energy value-added chain. These services, however, are better defined as
energy-related services.43 The WTO Services Sectoral Classification List
(W/120 list), prepared by the GATT Secretariat as a reference point in
scheduling specific commitments to assist the negotiation on services,
does not include a separate comprehensive entry for energy services.44
By using oil and gas as examples, the W/120 list has been criticized for
its inability to fully reflect the commercial reality of the energy supply
system.45 The various aspects of energy production, generation, trans-
mission, distribution, storage, consumption, etc., all involve highly pro-
fessional and technical services. Not only do they involve specialized
services unique to the energy sector, they also include other service sec-
tors—such as construction services and transportation services—which
have general applicability. Thus, it is rather difficult to categorize all the
41. See Article 2.1, 2.2 & Annex (Illustrative List) of the TRIMs Agreement. A brief
introduction to the TRIMs Agreement is available at World Trade Organization, http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_info_e.htm.
42. See, e.g., Philip Pierros, Exploring Certain Trade-Related Aspects of Energy Under
GATT/WTO: Demarcation Questions Regarding Electricity, 5 INT’L TRADE LAW & REGULATION
26 (1999).
43. WTO Secretariat, supra note 23, ¶ 9. R
44. Id. ¶ 10.
45. Simonetta Zarrilli & Irene Musselli, Oil and Gas Services: Market Liberalization and
the Ongoing GATS Negotiations, 8 J. INT’L ECONOMIC L. 551, 559 (2005). Note the various
proposals by WTO Members concerning the classification of energy sectors. Id. at 559–61.
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relevant service sectors into one “energy service” sector. Important en-
ergy services—transport, distribution, construction, consulting, engi-
neering, etc.—are covered by the respective horizontal categories in the
W/120 list, with an exception represented by 11(G)(a) “pipeline trans-
portation of fuels” that is listed as a separate sub-sector of transport ser-
vices. Meanwhile, some energy-related services are listed as separate
subsectors. For example, 1(F) “Other business services” covers some en-
ergy-related services. In addition to the W/120 list, the United Nations
Provisional Central Product Classification (UNCPC) does not list energy
services as a separate category. Annex I, however, provides a compen-
dium of energy-related products listed under different headings in the
UNCPC, including energy-related services. Technologically advanced
WTO Members are concerned as to whether energy-related services are
committed to be liberalized and, more importantly, whether specific
commitments will be listed in Members’ Schedules. Since an energy ser-
vice is not listed as a separate entry in the W/120 list, each Member is
free to tailor the sectoral coverage of its specific commitments on energy
services as it wishes.46 In light of such ambiguities in the definition of
energy services, WTO Members have undertaken very limited and
vague commitments in energy services in the Uruguay Round.47 It is,
thus, important for such technologically advanced WTO Members to se-
cure more market access opportunities through new service negotiations.
On a different note, energy trade in the service sector encounters other
obstacles such as domestic regulations and restrictive business prac-
tices,48 not to mention that the whole energy sector is subject to tight
environmental, health, and safety regulations.49 Another aspect of regu-
lation concerns public service obligations—as most governments main-
tain tight regulatory control to ensure that privatized energy suppliers
continue to provide certain essential services for the public’s general in-
terest. From this perspective, another key concern seems to be whether,
and under which circumstances, certain types of energy services may
qualify as “public services” under Article I:3(b) and be excluded from the
GATS discipline.50 Lastly, as governments remain the dominant buyers
in the energy market, provisions relating to government procurement
are likely to affect trade in energy services as well.51
46. Id. at 564.
47. For specific commitments in the energy sector made by WTO Members under the
Uruguay Round, see WTO Secretariat, supra note 23, ¶¶ 72–76, Table 9–11. R
48. Id. ¶ 37; Zarrilli & Musselli, supra note 45, at 578–79. R
49. WTO Secretariat, supra note 23, 69. R
50. Id. ¶ 70; Zarrilli & Musselli, supra note 45, at 575–77. R
51. Zarrilli & Musselli, supra note 45, at 567–72. R
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In summary, the legal framework of the GATT/WTO seems to
provide many, albeit not all, of the essential multilateral trade rules con-
cerning the various dimensions of energy trade. Note also that one major
dimension of energy security relating to energy trade has always been
the steady supply of energy resources. Considering the above-mentioned
GATT/WTO provisions most relevant to the supply of energy resources,
export control regulations definitely play a key part. The next Part will
continue to provide more detailed analysis of the export control regula-
tions under the GATT/WTO, with an aim of examining their adequacy
to deal with the energy security concerns of most WTO Members.
III. EXPORT CONTROL UNDER THE GATT 1994
A. Export Tariffs and Tariff Negotiations
A tariff is the only permissible trade policy tool under the GATT/
WTO legal regime to restrict imports and exports. Export tariffs, thus,
are not prohibited. Many countries impose high tariffs on the export of
domestic raw materials and, meanwhile, impose low or no export tariffs
on processed goods in order to further the development of domestic
processing industries. Such practice is similar to the problem of tariff
escalation—where raw material importing countries impose import du-
ties that rise with the degree of processing.52 The drafters of the GATT
1947 considered a complete abolition of export restrictions but ultimately
rejected the idea due to insufficient consensus among the original 23 con-
tracting parties.53 It has been proposed that negotiation on export tariff
bindings could be made “product by product or sector by sector on a
reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis.”54 However, such a propo-
sal has not materialized.
According to Article XXVIII bis:1, WTO Members can negotiate
the reduction and concession of export tariffs on a reciprocal basis.55
However, whether the result of such negotiation can be incorporated in
the Members’ Schedules of Concessions and, as a result, become part of
the legal regime under the WTO is not clear. Professor John Jackson ar-
gues that Article II refers to importation only, in particular Article II:1(b)
and II:1(c) where Members’ obligation under the Schedules are laid
down. Therefore, he feels that it would not be possible to include the
results of negotiation on export tariffs in the goods Schedules. As a re-
52. Frieder Roessler, GATT and Access to Supplies, 9 J. WORLD TRADE LAW 25, 31 (1975).
53. Id. at 28.
54. Id.
55. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art., XXVIII bis:1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
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sult, export commitments could not become part of the GATT and would
be treated as “any independent bilateral agreement between two mem-
bers of GATT and would apply for the benefit of all GATT members
under the “most favored nation (MFN)” obligations of Article I.”56 How-
ever, a scheduled concession incorporated into the GATT can only be
withdrawn if procedures safeguarding the interests of affected third
countries are observed, while a bilateral concession can be withdrawn by
agreement between the two parties concerned.57 In addition, the prohibi-
tion of raising custom duties in Article II:1(b) only applies to those goods
and tariff rates that are listed in the Members’ Schedules.
Other scholars, such as Roessler and Rom, reached a different con-
clusion on this matter based mainly on Article II:1(a), which provides
that Members shall accord to the commerce of the other Members’ treat-
ment “no less favorable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of
the appropriate Schedule annexed to [the GATT].”58 It was noted that the
language speaks of commerce, rather than imports, in this introductory
paragraph.59 Therefore, obligations contained in Article II can be applica-
ble to the negotiation on export tariffs concessions as well as the import
tariffs concessions. Furthermore, the possibility of negotiating export du-
ties was discussed during the preparatory work. Article XXVIII bis:1 also
recognizes the importance of substantially reducing the general level of
tariffs and other charges on imports and exports. This conclusion can also
find support in the preparatory work; some of the relevant provisions
included in Article XXVIII were discussed and appeared together with
Article I in the International Trade Organization draft charter at some
point. “The differentiation between export and import tariffs did not ex-
ist in principle when the articles were read or discussed successively
during the negotiations, but rather are explained by the preoccupation,
at the time, of the issue of imports.”60 In practice, nonetheless, few export
bindings have been incorporated. Concessions on tin exports that were
included in Malaysia’s and Singapore’s Schedules in the 1950s are two
such examples.61
Both arguments have their legal merits. According to Article
XXVIII, WTO Members can engage in negotiation on the reduction of the
general level of tariffs and other charges on export. Although Article
II:1(b) and (c) only refer to “importation,” it does not indicate that only
56. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 499, n.12. (1969); MITSUO
MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 220 (2003).
57. Roessler, supra note 52, at 34; Rom, supra note 38, at 128. R
58. GATT 1994, supra note 55, art. II:1(a). R
59. Roessler, supra note 52, at 35; Rom, supra note 38, at 128. R
60. Rom, supra note 37, at 128 & nn. 2–3.
61. Roessler, supra note 52, at 35–36.
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the result of “import tariffs” negotiations can be incorporated in the
Members’ Schedules. Nothing prevents the results of negotiations that
reduce export tariffs from being incorporated into Members’ Schedules,
which are an integral part of the GATT in accordance with Article II:7.
The controversial debate concerns whether WTO Members are permitted
to impose export tariffs higher than those inscribed and bound in their
Schedules, as such obligations are derived from Article II:1(b). The text of
Article II:1(b) refers only to “importation” with respect to the obligations
of WTO Members in terms of exempting “ordinary customs duties in
excess of those set forth and provided therein.”62
The textual reading of this sub-paragraph indicates that, even if
export tariffs are incorporated in the Schedules, Members may impose
export duties in excess of those set forth in their Schedules. In other
words, Members will still be acting consistently with Article II:1(b) when
they impose export duties higher than those set forth in their Schedules.
From this perspective, Professor Jackson’s argument seems quite lauda-
ble. However, assuming that the results of the negotiation on export tar-
iffs produce a certain level of tariffs rate as the highest rate and is
recorded in the Schedules, imposing export tariffs in excess of those set
forth therein might result in treatment “less favourable than that pro-
vided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule.”63 Under
such circumstances, WTO Members could arguably violate Article
II:1(a).64 This is what scholars like Roessler and Rom have argued. From
the jurisprudence regarding Article II, the importance of Article II:1(a) as
part of the context in the interpretation and application of Article II:1(b)
has indeed been addressed a few times. In Argentina—Measures Affecting
Imports of Footwear, Textile, Apparel and Other Items, the Appellate Body
states: “In accordance with the general rules of treaty interpretation set
out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention [on the law of the treaty], Arti-
cle II:1(b), first sentence, must be read in its context and in light of the
object and purpose of the [GATT 1994]. Article II:1(a) is part of the con-
text of Article II:1(b); it requires that a Member must accord to the com-
merce of the other Members ‘treatment no less favourable than that
provided for’ in its Schedule.”65 The Panel in the European Communities—
Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts also adopts such an
62. GATT 1994, supra note 55, art. II:1(b). R
63. Id. art. II:1(a).
64. However, such a Member bears the burden of proof in demonstrating that treat-
ment received as a result of higher export tariffs is less favorable than those listed under
the Schedule of Concession. This will depend on how such a negotiated export tariff is
prescribed under the Schedule of Concession.
65. WTO Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting Imports of Foot-
wear, Textile, Apparel and Other Items, ¶ 47, WT/DS56/AB/R (Mar. 27, 1998).
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interpretation.66 However, Article II:1(a) has not been subject to interpre-
tation and application by the panel or the Appellate Body and it is not
yet certain whether this paragraph can be invoked independently as the
legal base of a WTO dispute. The above-mentioned jurisprudence never-
theless shows that there might still be some legal space for the argu-
ments put forward by Roessler and Rom, that the GATT regime also
applies to export tariffs in incorporating such tariffs in the Members’
Schedules and being subject to the obligations for “bound tariffs” con-
tained in Article II.
If such argument stands, the result of negotiations on export tar-
iffs can be inscribed in the Members’ Schedules. Under such circum-
stances, should a certain export tariff rate imposed on a product be
recorded in a Member’s Schedule and this Member seeks to change this
rate, this will amount to a modification of the Schedule. Article XXVIII
sets out the conditions for the modification of Schedules and these condi-
tions are applicable to both the export and import tariffs set forth in the
Schedules. Consequently, Members that are affected by the change of
export tariffs by other Members who have prescribed such tariffs in their
Schedules might be able to request negotiations with those Members, as
provided for in Article XXVIII. Nonetheless, the GATT contains a bal-
anced legal framework for import tariff bindings “to ensure, on the one
hand, that the concession is not invalidated by other governmental mea-
sures and, on the other hand, that the concession can be withdrawn in
emergency situations.”67 However, such a balanced legal framework
does not exist in the case of export tariff bindings. For example, safe-
guard measures under Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguard only
refer to import, not export. Consequently, it seems that remedies for the
withdrawal of binding export tariffs will only be provided under general
exceptions such as Article XX.68 Such an asymmetry will need to be taken
into consideration when Members engage in export tariff concession
negotiations.
Under the WTO, Members are free to impose export duties on
products such as crude oil, coal, natural gas, etc. For WTO Members that
rely on a steady supply of such energy resources that are free from un-
reasonably high export tariffs or unexpected rise in such tariffs, it seems
possible to engage in tariff negotiations with Members that are exporters
of such products and to request that tariffs be set at the highest ceiling
66. WTO Report of the Panel, European Communities—Customs Classification of Fro-
zen Boneless Chicken Cuts, ¶¶ 7.63–7.65, WT/DS269/R (May 30, 2005).
67. Roessler, supra note 52, at 37. R
68. See id. at 37–39.
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that is recorded in the Schedules of Concessions.69 Such a negotiation, as
provided under Article XXVIII, needs to be conducted on a reciprocal
and mutually advantageous basis. To provide adequate incentives to re-
quest resource-rich Members to engage in the negotiation on the reduc-
tion of export tariffs, importing Members could offer to reduce their
import tariffs on processed or manufacturing products from exporting
Members in exchange for lower export tariffs on raw materials.70
B. Quantitative Restrictions on Export and Minimum Export Prices
According to Article XI:1, WTO Members are prohibited, in prin-
ciple, from imposing measures that prohibit or restrict both import and
export of their goods. Very few disputes have dealt directly with quanti-
tative restrictions on exports in the GATT 1947 era or in the WTO.71 In
Argentina—Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of
Finished Leather,72 the European Community (EC) alleged that Argentina,
through promulgating a series of resolutions, authorized the Argentin-
ean tanning industry to “participate in customs control procedures of
hides before export” and that such practices lead to a de facto export ban
from Argentina on bovine hides, which contravened Article XI:1. The
Panel stated that the disciplines of Article XI:1 extend to restrictions of a
de facto nature.73 The EC, alleging that this Argentinean measure consti-
tuted a de facto export restriction, bore the burden of proof. The Panel
found that the EC failed to provide sufficient evidence concerning: (1)
the mere presence of tanners’ representatives acted as an export restric-
tion;74 (2) the presence of tanners’ representatives enabled them to have
access to confidential business information which resulted in a reluc-
tance to export;75 and, (3) the tanners’ representatives, having access to
confidential information, abused such information so that exporters were
unwilling to export.76 The Panel, thus, concluded that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to prove that there was an export restriction made effec-
69. There are some instances where countries currently applying for accession to the
WTO are being requested to “bind” export duties at zero. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 3.
70. Roessler, supra note 52, at 30–33.
71. See generally WTO Analytical Index, Guide to WTO Law and Practice, http://
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/analytic_index_e.htm (last vis-
ited May 8, 2008).
72. WTO Report of the Panel, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine
Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000).
73. Id. ¶¶ 11.15–11.21.
74. Id. ¶¶ 11.22–11.35.
75. Id. ¶¶ 11.36–11.43.
76. Id. ¶¶ 11.44–11.54.
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tive by the measure in question within the meaning of Article XI.77 This
dispute, strictly speaking, did not involve export restrictions or per se
prohibitions adopted by WTO Members. It is to be noted, however, that
the Panel drew references to previous GATT or WTO cases addressing
quantitative restrictions on import,78 indicating that the jurisprudence
concerning quantitative restrictions on import in the interpretation and
application of Article XI:1 also applies to exports.
In addition to quantitative restrictions, Article XI also applies to
price-based prohibitions or restrictions on imports and exports. For ex-
ample, the adoption of a minimum price for imported products has been
found to be inconsistent with Article XI:1. In European Communities—Pro-
gramme of Minimum Import Prices, Licences, and Surety Deposits for Certain
Processed Fruits and Vegetables,79 the United States alleged that the EC vio-
lated Article XI:1 by setting the minimum import price for tomato con-
centrates and imposing the import licensing system and the associated
security deposit system.80 The EC argued that such measures were quali-
fied for the exemptions offered by Article XI:2(c)(i) and (ii).81 The GATT
Panel concluded that the minimum import price system, as enforced by
the additional security, was a restriction “other than duties, taxes or
other charges” within the meaning of Article XI:1 and did not qualify for
the exceptions contained in Article XI:2(c)(i) and (ii).82
In Japan—Trade in Semi-Conductors,83 the European Economic
Community (EEC) alleged that Japan violated Article XI by adopting a
series of measures to implement a Japan/U.S. arrangement in the semi-
conductor trade. One such measure concerned the commitment made by
the Japanese government to monitor cost and export prices on the prod-
ucts exported by Japanese semi-conductor firms from Japan to certain
markets (non-U.S. markets) to prevent below-cost exports. The EEC re-
77. Id. ¶ 11.55.
78. For example, the Panel referred to the GATT Panel Report, Japan—Trade in Semi-
Conductors and the Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importa-
tion, Sale and Distribution of Banana when it concluded that Article XI extends to restrictions
of a de facto nature. It also referred to the Panel Reports, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
II and Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper when it stated that
action taken by private party might be regarded as governmental measures should there be
sufficient governmental involvement. Id. ¶¶ 11.17–11.21 and accompanying footnotes.
79. WTO Report of the Panel, European Communities—Programme of Minimum Im-
port Prices, Licences, and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, L/
4687 BISD 25S/68 (Oct. 18, 1978).
80. Id. ¶¶ 3.1, 3.2.
81. Id. ¶¶ 3.6, 3.16, 3.22, 3.34, 3.29–3.32
82. Id. ¶¶ 4.9–4.14.
83. WTO Report of the Panel, Japan—Trade in Semi-Conductors, L/6309 BISD 35S/
116 (May 4, 1988).
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garded such a measure, albeit not legally binding, as contravening Arti-
cle XI:1, since its implementation acted as export controls with price and
had quantitative effects on the exports of semi-conductors.84 Japan main-
tained that such a monitoring program was not intended to prohibit or
restrict trade and did not set minimum price requirements. It was the
firms, not the Japanese government, that set the export prices and de-
cided whether to export or not. Such a measure, argued Japan, did not
fall under Article XI:1.85
Referring to previous panel reports adopted by “CONTRACTING
PARTIES” confirming the inconsistency of minimum import price with
Article XI:1, this Panel considered that such a principle applies to restric-
tions on exports below certain prices.86 The Panel also noted that Article
XI:1 did not refer to laws or regulations but referred more broadly to
measures, irrespective of the legal status of the measure.87 Under these
circumstances, the Panel found that, by monitoring export prices to
third-country markets, requiring exporters to supply information on ex-
port prices with heavy penalties attached for failure to comply, and set-
ting up the operation of supply and demand forecast to intervene in the
production level of semi-conductors, the Japanese government exerted
maximum possible pressure on the private sector to cease exporting at
prices below company-specific costs.88 Such complex measures, there-
fore, constituted a coherent system restricting the sale for export of moni-
tored semi-conductors at prices below company specific-costs to markets
other than the United States and were inconsistent with Article XI:1.89
According to Japan—Trade in Semi-Conductors, the imposition of
minimum export prices constitutes quantitative restrictions and will be
inconsistent with Article XI:1. Can supply restrictive measures, such as
controlling the production of goods to influence prices, also be character-
ized as quantitative restrictions that potentially violate Article XI:1? This
is the key question addressing the issue of whether the production quo-
tas imposed by OPEC countries that are also WTO Members contravene
their legal obligations under the GATT/WTO. By referring to Japan—
Trade in Semi-Conductors, Professor Desta argues that this principle is also
applicable to restrictions on exports below certain prices: “[A]s long as
OPEC decisions to restrict supplies are caused by falling prices below the
OPEC-approved price range or any other threshold, such measures
84. Id. ¶¶ 49–55.
85. Id. ¶¶ 50, 54.
86. Id. ¶ 105.
87. Id. ¶ 106.
88. Id. ¶¶ 113–17.
89. Id. ¶¶ 109–17.
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could well qualify as quantitative restrictions effected through minimum
export prices requirements.”90
Such an argument has been questioned by others. Broome cau-
tions that a material distinction remains between export restrictions and
production restrictions.91 He argues that oil in its natural state—oil still
in the ground—cannot be characterized as a “product” within the mean-
ing of Article XI, as it has not gone through a production process.92 Only
oil in commerce—oil that is extracted and produced for consumption—
can be regarded as falling under the GATT jurisdiction.93 Therefore, only
when OPEC countries restrict the quantity of oil in commerce made
available for export to foreign consumers could they then violate Article
XI:1.94 He further points out that, while the jurisprudence tends to inter-
pret Article XI:1 broadly, absurd and unintended consequences could
arise if the panel or the Appellate Body does not pay attention to such
differences; when a WTO Member took some measure to reduce domes-
tic production in a particular industry, any WTO Member could com-
plain that the country was violating Article XI:1 by influencing prices via
supply restrictions.95 In other words, “any measure that prevents an in-
dustry from operating at maximum capacity might constitute an export
restriction.”96 Broome, thus, concludes that the production quotas main-
tained by OPEC countries should not constitute quantitative restrictions
that contravene Article XI:1.97
Both arguments are persuasive. On one hand, per Japan—Trade in
Semi-Conductors, one of the measures adopted by the Japanese govern-
ment, and later found to be inconsistent with Article XI:1, was to “per-
suade” the domestic firms to control their production level via the
supply and demand forecast mechanism.98 Although this aspect was not
found to be influencing or producing the minimum export prices, which
are inconsistent with Article XI:1, this does demonstrate that production
control can influence export prices and might, indirectly, be regarded as
quantitative restrictions on export. From this perspective, imposing pro-
90. Desta et al., supra note 5, at 534. R
91. Stephen A. Broome, Conflicting Obligations for Oil Exporting Nations?: Satisfying
Membership Requirements of Both OPEC and the WTO, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 409, 416
(2006).
92. Id. at 416–17.
93. Id. at 417.
94. Id. at 416–17.
95. Id. at 418.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 418–19.
98. See the previous discussion on Japan—Trade in Semi-Conductors, supra note 83, ¶¶ R
113–17.
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duction quotas with an aim of maintaining the export price for crude oil
at a certain level, or as a means of controlling export price, might be
perceived as influencing and imposing a minimum export price; a form
of quantitative restriction on export that contravenes Article XI:1.
On the other hand, rather than regarding production restriction as
a means of achieving minimum export price, Broome seems to perceive
such a measure as simply controlling the amount and level of produc-
tion. Following this logic, Article XI:1 could be regarded as prohibiting
or restricting the rate of resources exploitation if production restrictions
are prohibited. Such a perception on production restriction has its merits
in differentiating between “oil in commerce” and “oil in natural state,”
especially if Article XI:1 is not to be used as a tool to dictate to WTO
Members how and to what extent they should exploit their natural
resources.99
However, the differentiation between oil in commerce and oil in
natural state does not seem to find any support under the GATT/WTO
legal regime. Even if such a differentiation exists, it seems applicable to
commodities rather than processed or manufactured products and this
distinction, itself, cannot be found under the GATT/WTO. In addition,
legal obligations under the WTO legal framework could be undermined
if such a differentiation is permitted. For example, if “material” in its
natural state is not regarded as “products” and, thus, is not regulated
under the GATT/WTO, does this mean that export subsidies to agricul-
tural products that are not yet harvested—in their natural state—are not
prohibited subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidy and Counter-
vailing Measures? Would these agricultural products have to comply
with obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture, as these are not
“products” under the GATT/WTO?
Apparently such implications are contrary to the object and pur-
pose of the WTO. Therefore, it is neither legal nor suitable to have such a
differentiation under the WTO legal framework. The concerns expressed
by Broome, i.e., the sovereign right of WTO Members to determine their
use of natural resources, can be addressed by other provisions under the
GATT/WTO, such as Article XI:2(a) or Article XX(g), which provide an
exception to Article XI:1. Therefore, it seems that the argument by Desta
is more credible in concluding that production quotas mandated by
OPEC countries, when the price of crude oil falls below a certain level,
might be regarded as quantitative restrictions on export that contravene
Article XI:1.100
99. Broome, supra note 91, at 418–19. R
100. However, countries adopting such a production quota might rely on general ex-
ceptions contained in the GATT to justify such measures. See the following discussion.
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In addition to Article XI, Article XIII also provides relevant provi-
sions when Members adopt quantitative restrictions on import and ex-
port. Article XIII:2–4 sets down principles of applying import restrictions
via quota allocation and import licensing requirements, such as trans-
parency and non-discrimination. Article XIII:5 states, “[I]n so far as ap-
plicable, the principles of this Article shall also extend to export
restrictions.”101 In other words, principles concerning import quota and
import licensing requirements, as laid down in Article XIII:2–4, are ap-
plicable to export quota and export licensing requirements in so far as
applicable. It has been suggested that the GATT instructions for non-dis-
criminatory administration of import restrictions are broad enough to be
applicable, in most cases, to non-discriminating treatment of export
restrictions.
Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that Article XIII:4 states:
“With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2 (d)
of this Article or under paragraph 2 (c) of Article XI.” And Article XI:2(c)
only refers to import restrictions.102 Other than this, most of the principles
in Article XIII:2–4 should be applicable to export restrictions as well.103
However, the meaning of the term “in so far as applicable” is rather
vague and has not been interpreted or applied by previous panels or
Appellate Body reports. This might result in uncertainty among WTO
Members when they seek to challenge, for example, export quotas
adopted by oil exporting countries under the WTO.
It also needs to be noted that Article XI and Article XIII specifi-
cally state that the terms “export restrictions” included in these articles
“include restrictions made effective through state-trading enterprises.”104
Considering the prevailing practices in the developing countries where
the exploitation and trade in energy resources are conducted by state
trading enterprises, these provisions are also quite important in energy
trade.
C. Exceptions to Export Control Under the GATT/WTO
Article XI:2 provides several exceptions to the obligations con-
tained in Article XI:1 and such exceptions are relevant to quantitative
restrictions on exports. In the 1987 Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of
101. GATT 1994, supra note 55, art. XIII:5. R
102. Article XI:2(c) states, “The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend
to the following: . . . (c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, im-
ported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which oper-
ate.” GATT 1994, supra note 55, art. XI:2(c). R
103. Rom, supra note 38, at 131–32. R
104. GATT 1994, supra note 55, arts. XI, XIII. R
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Unprocessed Herring and Salmon case,105 the United States alleged that the
export restrictions maintained by Canada on unprocessed sockeye
salmon, pink salmon, and herring were inconsistent with the obligations
under Article XI:1 and could not be justified under Article XX. Canada
argued that such export restrictions were consistent with Article XI:2(b)
and Article XX(g). For Article XI:2(b), Canada argued that unprocessed
salmon and herring were “commodities” and the regulation in dispute
dealt with “standard” and “marketing” within the meaning of Article
XI:2(b).106 Canada further argued that without these prohibitions, Cana-
dian processors would not have been able to develop a superior quality
fish product for marketing abroad and would not have been able to
maintain their share of the market for herring roe in the international
markets.107
The Panel noted, first, that Canada prohibited export of certain
unprocessed salmon and unprocessed herring even if they could meet
the standards generally applied to fish exported from Canada.108 The
Panel therefore found that these export prohibitions could not be consid-
ered “necessary” to the application of standards within the meaning of
Article XI:2(b).109
Second, the Panel noted that this provision referred to “regula-
tions . . . for the marketing of commodities in international trade,”
which suggests that the regulations covered by the provisions are not all
regulations that facilitate foreign sales but only those that apply to the
marketing as such. During the drafting of Article XI:2(b), mention was
made only of export restrictions designed to promote foreign sales of the
restricted product but not of export restrictions on one commodity de-
signed to promote sales of another commodity.110 The broad interpreta-
tion of the term “marketing regulation” implied in Canada’s argument
would have the consequence that any import or export restriction pro-
tecting a domestic industry and enabling it to sell abroad would be ex-
empted from the GATT prohibition of import and export restrictions.111
Such an interpretation would therefore expand the scope of the provi-
sion far beyond its purpose. The Panel, thus, found that the export
prohibitions on certain unprocessed salmon and unprocessed herring
105. WTO Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon, L/6268-35S/98 (Mar. 22, 1988).
106. Id. ¶ 3.17
107. Id. ¶¶ 3.16–3.18, 3.22.
108. Id. ¶ 4.2.
109. Id.
110. WTO Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon, ¶ 4.3, L/6268-35S/98 (Mar. 22, 1988).
111. Id.
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were not “regulations for the marketing” of processed salmon and her-
ring in international trade within the meaning of Article XI:2(b).112 In
light of the considerations set out above, the Panel concluded that the
export prohibitions were not justified by Article XI:2(b).113
This is the only GATT/WTO dispute that deals directly with the
interpretation and application of Article XI:2(b) and there have been no
cases concerning Article XI:2(a). In fact, there is very limited jurispru-
dence invoking these two sub-paragraphs to justify quantitative restric-
tions on exports.114 As a result, key terms such as “critical storages of
food stuff,” “products essential” to the exporting countries, “temporarily
applied” under Article XI:2(a), or “necessary” under Article XI:2(b) have
never been subject to examinations or interpretations in the relevant
jurisprudence.
In addition to Article XI:2, Article XII and Article XVIII:B also pro-
vide exceptions to Article XI:1 and Article XIII for WTO Members en-
countering balance of payment (BOP) difficulties. Both Article XII and
Article XVIII:B refer only to “import restrictions.”115 The exceptions for
BOP purposes set forth in these two articles provide the opportunity for
Members with BOP deficits to adopt measures to increase their monetary
reserves. The prevailing measure has been to impose quantitative or
price-based import restrictions with an aim of decreasing the drawing of
monetary reserves.116
Furthermore, export earning remains an important source of mon-
etary reserve and, hence, countries facing BOP deficit are unlikely to im-
pose quantitative export restrictions or minimum export prices. This
could be the main reason behind the use of the term “import restrictions”
in Article XII and Article XVIII:B. However, sometimes an export
surcharge or control that raises revenue from export can be the best
112. Id.
113. Id. ¶ 4.3.
114. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 56, at 218. R
115. Article XII:1 states: “Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI,
any contracting party, in order to safeguard its external financial position and its balance of
payments, may restrict the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported, sub-
ject to the provisions of the following paragraphs of this Article.” GATT 1994, supra note 55, R
art. XII:1 (emphasis added). Article XVIII:B:9 states: “In order to safeguard its external fi-
nancial position and to ensure a level of reserves adequate for the implementation of its
programme of economic development, a contracting party coming within the scope of par-
agraph 4 (a) of this Article may, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 10 to 12, control the
general level of its imports by restricting the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to
be imported.” GATT 1994, supra note 55, art. XVIII:B:9 (emphasis added). R
116. WTO, Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, ¶ 2, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/09-bops_e.htm.
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method of improving the foreign exchange deficit.117 A quantitative ex-
port control on valuable or rare products might also increase the export
prices, resulting in the similar effect of raising revenue from export. Nev-
ertheless, as only “import restrictions” are mentioned in Article XII and
Article XVIII:B, whether such export control measures are authorized
under these two articles is questionable. In other words, while such
quantitative or price-based export restrictions can also meet the need for
Members encountering BOP difficulties, the explicit treaty language and
terms used in Article XII and Article XVIII:B regarding export control
measures are not likely to be invoked as exceptions for BOP difficulties
under the GATT/WTO.
With regard to Article XIII, Article XIV provides that restrictions
under Article XII or under Article XVIII:B may deviate from the provi-
sions of Article XIII under specific conditions.118 As has been mentioned,
Article XIII:2–4 deals with import restrictions and, hence, Article XIV
seems to apply mainly to import restriction measures.119 However, note
that Article XIV:4 states:
A contracting party applying import restrictions under Article
XII or under Section B of Article XVIII shall not be precluded
by Article XI to XV or Section B of Article XVIII of this Agree-
ment from applying measures to direct its exports in such a man-
ner as to increase its earnings of currencies which it can use
without deviation from the provisions of Article XIII.120
Does the “measures to direct its exports” clause permit Members to
adopt import-restriction measures for BOP purposes and to adopt export
quota or export licensing requirements, with the aim of selecting the des-
tination countries? For example, does it only allow exports to the coun-
tries that offer the highest prices or to markets with the highest historical
import price? Nevertheless, as this paragraph has not been subject to in-
terpretation in previous cases, it would be difficult to speculate how such
measures would actually be applied. Furthermore, as the use of such
measures cannot deviate from Article XIII, the ambiguity concerning the
application and interpretation of Article XIII:5 should also be taken into
consideration.
There are two provisions under the GATT 1994 that provide ex-
ceptions to other general principles: Article XX on General Exceptions
117. Rom, supra note 38, at 131. R
118. See GATT 1994, supra note 55, arts. XIV:1–2. R
119. Rom, supra note 38, 132. R
120. GATT 1994, supra note 55, art. XIV:4 (emphasis added). R
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and Article XXI on Security Exceptions. For export control involving en-
ergy products, these two exceptions are very crucial.
For the general exceptions provided in Article XX, the following
sub-paragraphs might be most relevant concerning export control of en-
ergy goods: Article XX(g), (h), (i), and (j). If energy resources exporting
countries adopt export restrictive measures, can such measures be justi-
fied under these exceptions?
There are quite a few GATT and WTO disputes involving Article
XX(g), but most of them relate to import restrictions. The only dispute
that concerns export restrictions is the above-mentioned case, Canada—
Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon.121 Neverthe-
less, key terms and their interpretations in the application of Article
XX(g), such as “exhaustible natural resources,” “relating to,” and “in con-
junction with”122 seem applicable to both import and export restrictions.
Mineral energy resources such as coal and crude oil are no doubt “ex-
haustible natural resources.”
Should a Member adopt export restrictions on oil or coal and in-
voke Article XX(g) as an exception, it also has to demonstrate that this
measure is “relating to” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
and is made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic pro-
duction or consumption. The term “relating to” has been interpreted as
meaning “primarily aimed at.”123 In the 1998 case, United States—Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, the Appellate Body pro-
posed that there must be “a close and genuine relationship of ends and
means” before it can determine whether such a measure is “relating to”
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.124 Following such an
interpretive approach, a production quota adopted by OPEC with an aim
of stabilizing the oil price might not be regarded as a measure “primarily
aimed at” the conservation of oil, and, thus, might be difficult to justify
under Article XX(g).
However, one commentator has argued that “conservation of a
mineral resource such as oil cannot be seen in isolation from the financial
return of its exploitation for its owners, and production restriction deci-
121. See WTO Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Un-
processed Herring and Salmon, L/6268-35S/98 (Mar. 22, 1988). The interpretations of the
terms “relating to” and “in conjunction with” in Article XX(g) in this GATT dispute are
widely referred to in future cases concerning the application of Article XX(g).
122. Article XX(g) permits exception measures which are “relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.” GATT 1994, supra note 55, art. XX(g). R
123. Id. ¶ 4.6.
124. WTO Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 136, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
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sions caused by falling market prices should be construed as ‘relating to
the conservation’ of the resources.”125 In addition, another commentator
also argued that, for countries that rely heavily on the export earning of
such natural resources, market stability would permit them to receive
dependable income, which can be seen as an essential element in their
efforts to manage and ensure conservation of their resources.126 From this
perspective, production restrictions adopted as a response to falling
commodity prices and the conservation of energy resources seem to have
a “close and genuine relationship of ends and means.”127
Second, such measures need to be made effective “in conjunction
with” restrictions on domestic production or consumption. Note that Ar-
ticle XX(g) only requires the exporting country to have simultaneous do-
mestic restriction on production or consumption. Decision-based supply
restrictions and production quotas taken by OPEC countries are necessa-
rily implemented via domestic production cuts.128 Therefore, it will be
quite straightforward to prove that such supply restrictive measures are
made effective in conjunction with domestic production.129
As for Article XX(h), the Panel in EEC—Import Regime for Bananas
noted that Article XX(h) sets out three methods by which an intergovern-
mental commodity agreement can be brought within the exception in
this sub-paragraph:
[(1)] either it conforms to criteria which have been submitted
to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and not disapproved by
them, or, [(2)] the agreement itself is submitted to and not dis-
approved by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, or, [(3)] the
agreement conforms to the principles approved by the
ECOSOC Resolution 30(IV) of 28 March 1947.130
The Panel noted that no criteria for commodity agreements had ever
been submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, nor had any commod-
ity agreements themselves been “so submitted and so disapproved.” The
Panel considered that, to benefit from the exception in Article XX(h),
such criteria or agreements had to be submitted to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES with an explicit invocation of that provision.131
125. Desta et al., supra note 4, at 536. R
126. Broome, supra note 91, at 427. R
127. Id.
128. Desta et al., supra note 4, at 537. R
129. Id.
130. WTO Report of the Panel, EEC—Import Regime for Bananas, ¶ 166, DS38/R (Feb.
11, 1994).
131. Id.
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As for the principles in the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) Resolution 30(IV), the Panel noted that this Resolution re-
quired that “the negotiation of, and participation in, an international
commodity agreement must be open to all interested countries and must
avoid, as also stipulated in the requirements set out at the beginning of
Article XX of the General Agreement, unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries.”132 From the criteria set forth in this case, it seems rather
difficult to successfully invoke Article XX(h) as an exception, as the
OPEC or any other international commodity agreements does not seem
to have met such criteria.
As has been mentioned, most energy resource exporting countries
maintain a two-tiered pricing mechanism by imposing an export price
higher than the domestic price. Can such a measure be justified under
Article XX(i)? This provision requires that such export restrictions shall
not operate to increase the protection afforded to the domestic process-
ing industry or to increase the export of such industry. As has been indi-
cated, the main purpose of the two-tiered pricing scheme is to protect the
relevant domestic industry. From this perspective, such measures might
fail to be justified under Article XX(i).
Article XX(j) is quite similar to Article XI:2(a) as both articles in-
volve temporary measures adopted to deal with shortage of supply.
However, while export “restrictions” are permitted under Article XX(j),
both export “prohibition” and “restrictions” are permitted under Article
XI:2(a).133 Under Article XX(j), when a Member adopts restrictive mea-
sures to respond to short supply, all other Members are “entitled to an
equitable share of the international supply of such products.” But under
Article XI:2(a), a Member can prohibit the export of products essential to
itself.134 Nevertheless, conditions set forth under Article XX(j) seem to be
more stringent than those under Article XI:2(a), as the latter does not
require an equitable distribution to all Members or require such prohibi-
tion or restriction to be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise
132. Id.
133. GATT 1994, Article XI:2(a) states that, “Export prohibitions or restrictions tempora-
rily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential
to the exporting contracting party,” but Article XX(j) does not limit its application to “ex-
port” only. GATT 1994, supra note 55, art. XI:2(a) (emphasis added). R
134. GATT 1994, Article XX(j) states that: “[E]ssential to the acquisition or distribution
of products in general or local short supply; Provided that any such measures shall be con-
sistent with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the
international supply of such products, and that any such measures, which are inconsistent
with the other provisions of the Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions
giving rise to them have ceased to exist. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the
need for this sub-paragraph not later than 30 June 1960.” GATT 1994, supra note 55, art. R
XX(j). Article XI:2(a) does not contain such conditions. Id. art. XI:2(a).
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to them have ceased to exist. Such differences matter because Members
that seek complete export prohibition, rather than export restriction,
might have better chances to apply the exception under Article XI:2(a)
and, perhaps, can only resort to Article XI:2(a).
The relationship between the Article XI:2(a) and Article XX(j)
needs to be further clarified, as a failure to do so might result in difficul-
ties and controversies in their application. For export control measures
imposed in energy resources, it might be quite burdensome to invoke
Article XX(j) as an exception because, under this provision, Members
adopting export control measures need to ensure that all WTO Members
are “entitled to an equitable share of the international supply.” In other
words, when a Member adopts export control measures under Article
XX(j), all other WTO Members seem to have the “entitlement” to an equi-
table share of such product in international supply. From the perspective
of importing countries, however, this requirement seems able to provide
a certain amount of security, in terms of acquiring the right to a share of
such a product.
In addition to meeting individual requirements contained in each
sub-paragraph, Members that seek to resort to Article XX also need to
comply with the requirements under the chapeau. The Article XX cha-
peau “poses a critical question for trade-environment policy” as it deter-
mines the conditions under which national governments can pursue
ecological goals by restricting international trade.135 Furthermore, Mem-
bers invoking Article XX exceptions bear the burden of proof. Therefore,
it seems quite difficult to invoke Article XX to justify export restrictive
measures on energy resources.
Apart from Article XX, the exceptions that have been particularly
relevant to export restrictions on energy goods are the national security
exceptions under Article XXI.136 It has been observed that:
[M]any aspects of international trade in energy have devel-
oped outside the structure of GATT or with the implied as-
sumption that Article XXI or another GATT exception would
take them out of normal GATT arrangements. National secur-
ity matters have often played a role in energy law and policy
in a way that overrides free trade objectives.137
135. Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised
Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 739, 739 (2001).
136. Roessler, supra note 52, at 29–30.
137. Donald N. Zillman, Energy Trade and the National Security Exception to the GATT, 12
J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 117, 117 (1994).
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Because the national security exceptions under Article XXI could be in-
voked to avoid the GATT/WTO obligations of restricting and prohibit-
ing export control measures, this Article must be analyzed.
There have been very few disputes involving Article XXI and only
one panel report was adopted under the GATT.138 “In the late 1940s
when the provision was drafted, atomic technology was the most visible
example.”139 Other types of energy and their related issues had not yet
emerged. Articles XXI, thus, was not drafted with energy trade in mind.
A crucial issue in the application of Article XXI in international trade in
energy concerns the concept of “security”; specifically, whether energy
security, as identified in this paper, is a part of the “security” Article XXI
seeks to address. In addition, for OPEC countries or any countries that
rely heavily on the revenue from oil export, could the decrease of oil
prices result in an emergency in international relations? Such an emer-
gency is another condition under which exception measures can be
adopted according to Article XXI(b)(iii).
First, referring to the few disputes in the GATT, as well as the
negotiation history, Broome concludes that economic security interests
might not be considered as falling under the concept of “security” in Ar-
ticle XXI.140 However, national security is an evolving concept. From 1949
to 1990, “essential security interests” centered on the use of military force
(including two World Wars and the ensuing Cold War)141 to preserve
national sovereignty. From 1989–1991, however, the concept of “essential
security interests” changed as a result of the fall of the Berlin Wall and
the break-up of the former Soviet Union.142 The rise of Middle East ten-
sions, nuclear threats from countries such as North Korea, internal con-
flict and the threat of disintegration for religious or ethnic identity
reasons, humanitarian activity that requires military involvement, along
with many other issues, are all part of the “essential security interests”
and suggest the degree of diversity that might lie behind the concept of
“security.”143 Second, Article XXI itself is a mix of references to the nar-
rowly tailored concept of military security, as defined in Article
XXI(b)(ii), and the more extensive concept of “security” defined in Article
XXI(b)(iii). Finally, countries such as the United States have defined “es-
sential security” to include matters beyond military threats since the
138. For a detailed analysis of the GATT 1994 Article XXI and its relevant disputes, see
Catherine Li, International Trade and National Security—An Analysis of Article XXI of GATT on
Security Exception, 34 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L.J. 229 (2005) (this article is written in Chinese).
139. Zillman, supra note 137, at 118. R
140. Broome, supra note 91, at 429–31. R
141. Zillman, supra note 137, at 124. R
142. Id. at 124–25.
143. Id. at 126.
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1980s.144 All these factors suggest that concerns for energy security might
be brought under the evolving meaning and concept of “security” under
Article XXI.
From the relevant disputes, Members invoking Article XXI to jus-
tify their trade restrictive measures often argue that “essential security
interests” should be based on their own determinations.145 Panels and the
CONTRACTING PARTIES in the GATT 1947 era have not adopted any
standards in the interpretation of this term.146 Whether the panel or the
Appellate Body will leave such discretion to Members invoking Article
XXI is yet to be observed. However, assuming that such a dispute does
arise and that the panel or the Appellate Body finds that such measures
cannot be justified under Article XXI, what kind of recommendations
will be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)?
Due to the political sensitivity usually involved with such dis-
putes, it seems unlikely for the DSB to recommend that a Member’s mea-
sure, purported to be relevant to the defense of an essential security
interest, should be withdrawn.147 Furthermore, assuming that the DSB
does make such a recommendation and the defending Member refuses
to implement such a recommendation, the complaining Member could
seek authorization from the DSB for retaliation under the prevailing
practices and according to the legal rules of the WTO’s Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).148
This scenario, from the perspective of a complaining Member that de-
pends on the importation of energy resources from a defending Member,
does not provide any relief from the shortage of energy. Only when the
complaining Member is considerably more powerful than the defending
Member will this threat of retaliation seem credible. If this is the case, the
more powerful complaining Member might as well apply other pressure
through diplomatic channels and exert other political or economic pres-
sures to “persuade” the defending Member to withdraw its export con-
trol measures, rather than resorting to the lengthy and costly litigation
process under the WTO.
From this viewpoint, Article XXI seems to have serious impacts on
those WTO Members that are dependent on imported energy resources
but are without strong political power or economic status. On one hand,
144. Id.
145. Such an argument was put forward by the United States in the 1949 United States
vs. Czechoslovakia dispute and by Ghana in the 1961 Ghana vs. Portugal dispute in the
GATT era. See Zillman, supra note 137, at 119. R
146. Li, supra note 138, at 246–47. R
147. Id. at 251, 266.
148. See WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, art. 22, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm.
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the possibility of successfully invoking Article XXI seems quite small or
unpredictable, while on the other hand, even if the defending Member
fails to justify its export restrictive measure under Article XXI and the
withdrawal of such measure is recommended by the DSB, the conse-
quent implementation and retaliation provided under the DSU cannot
provide any assurance for the complaining Member to address its energy
security concern.
D. Summary
The main energy security concern for countries that rely on im-
ported energy is the stable and uninterrupted access to reasonably priced
energy resources. Therefore, any export control measures, including ex-
port tariffs and quantitative restrictions, instituted, maintained, or inten-
sified by the energy resource exporting countries will affect these energy
security concerns because these measures influence the price and quan-
tity available to the importing countries. According to Article XXVIII, the
reduction and elimination of export tariffs can be subject to negotiation.
Importing Members can of course bring such negotiation to the attention
of exporting Members under the WTO, however, Article XXVIII provides
that such negotiation needs to be based on reciprocity. Importing Mem-
bers need to be prepared to hand out concessions in exchange for export
tariff reductions. In addition, as Article II:1(b) only refers to “import”
duties, whether the principle of tariff binding applies to export tariffs
remains debatable. Article II:1(a) might provide some assurance, but its
actual application remains to be seen. As a result, provisions relating to
export tariffs under the GATT/WTO seem to play a limited role in ad-
dressing WTO Members’ energy security concerns.
With regard to quantitative restrictions on exports, relevant provi-
sions and jurisprudence under the GATT 1994 provide that quantitative
restrictions via quota or licensing requirements on exports, as well as
price-based restrictions—such as minimum export price—are prohibited
or restricted. Nevertheless, whether the production quota maintained by
OPEC countries constitutes a quantitative restriction is not yet conclu-
sive. Regardless of such regulations, there are quite a few exceptions pro-
vided under the GATT 1994 that can be invoked by the exporting
Members to justify their export restrictive measures. Considering the
nonrenewable characteristics of mineral energy resources, there might be
plenty of room for exporting Members to find legitimate exceptions
under Article XI:2 and Article XX. In addition, considering the strategic
importance of energy resources, Article XXI seems to be another “safe
harbor” for exporting Members.
As has been mentioned, most of the major energy resource export-
ing countries are either WTO Members or are in the process of becoming
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WTO Members. However, from the analysis of this Part, the export con-
trol regulations under the GATT/WTO do not seem adequate to address
the energy security concerns for WTO Members relying on imported en-
ergy. Therefore, it must be determined whether these countries’ energy
security concerns can be addressed by the regional agreements instead of
the GATT/WTO.
IV. REGIONAL AGREEMENTS AND ENERGY SECURITY:
NAFTA AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY
It has so far been concluded that legal framework under the WTO
and its export control regulations, cannot adequately address Members’
energy security concerns. As a result, some WTO Members that depend
on imported energy began to negotiate and conclude regional agree-
ments, or free trade agreements, with their major supply countries to
provide more predictable and reliable legal frameworks for energy. This
Part will use two such regional agreements—NAFTA (in particular
Chapter 6) and the ECT (focusing on their trade-related provisions)—as
case studies to examine whether such regional agreements can provide
more security for countries that rely on imported energy than the WTO.
A. Chapter 6 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
According to the statistics of the U.S. Department of Energy, Ca-
nada and Mexico were the first and second largest exporters of crude oil
and petroleum, respectively, to the United States in 2005 and 2006.149 Ca-
nada and Mexico are also the first and second largest exporters of natural
gases via pipeline to the United States respectively.150 The United States
began its bilateral negotiation with Canada in the mid-1980s and the Ca-
nada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CU-FTA) was formally concluded in
1998. The United States then began negotiation for a free trade agree-
ment (FTA) with Mexico in 1990 and was joined by Canada in 1991.
NAFTA was then formally created by these three countries in 1992.151 A
brief historical account on the negotiation history of NAFTA, with spe-
cial concerns and historical background of Mexico concerning oil, will be
149. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CRUDE OIL AND TOTAL PETROLEUM IMPORTS TOP 15 COUN-
TRIES, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/
company_level_imports/current/import.html.
150. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. NATURAL GAS IMPORT BY COUNTRY, available at http://
tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_s1_m.htm.
151. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, 32 I.L.M. 289 (pts. 1-3); 32 I.L.M. 605
(pts. 4-8) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. For chronologies of the
Canada—U.S. FTA and the NAFTA, see http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements
-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fast-facts-US.aspx?lang=EN.
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presented. Chapter 6 (the Energy Chapter) of NAFTA will then be
discussed.
1. Energy Trade Under NAFTA: Background and Controversies
When the United States, Mexico, and Canada agreed to negotiate
the provisions of a free trade agreement, it was inevitable that energy
would play a major role in the resulting agreement. “From a more na-
tional perspective, the possibility that NAFTA will foster increased en-
ergy trade among the U.S., Canada and Mexico has been advanced as a
political argument in support of the treaty.”152 Nonetheless, considering
the special position held by petroleum industries in these three countries,
provisions relating to energy are rather unique under NAFTA, especially
when compared to other FTAs.153
For the United States, more stringent domestic environmental reg-
ulations on energy-related activities “have caused a steep decline in U.S.
oil exploration.”154 In addition, the following North American energy
policy goals of the U.S. administration also fit within the NAFTA frame-
work: to increase self-sufficiency in North America by cooperating with
Canada and Mexico, to decrease dependency on Middle East oil, to in-
crease domestic production, and to decrease soaring U.S. demand for
petroleum.155
For Canada, “many Canadians feel that NAFTA prevents them
from conserving their own natural resources,” and some have called for
the Canadian government “to follow Mexico’s lead and reassert sover-
eignty over its energy resources.”156 While the U.S. government is
pressed by their environmental proponents to preserve rich natural re-
sources in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, some Canadians believe
that NAFTA could lead to a situation where “Canadian corporations are
depleting Canada’s natural resources to meet American demand.”157 In
addition, as the U.S. demand for gasoline has increased in recent years,
gasoline prices in Canada have skyrocketed because NAFTA requires
that a party charge the same prices domestically that they charge for
152. Ernest E. Smith & David P. Cluchey, GATT, NAFTA and the Trade in Energy: A U.S.
Perspective, 12 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 27, 33 (1994).
153. Richard D. English, Energy in the NAFTA: Free Trade Confronts Mexico’s Constitution,
1 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (1993).
154. Middleton, supra note 10, at 201. R
155. Middleton, supra note 10, at 180–84.
156. John Fohr, How NAFTA Increases Global Energy Security, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 741, 758
(2004).
157. Id. at 758–59.
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their exports.158 All these concerns of Canada have been expressed to-
ward the Energy Chapter under NAFTA.
For Mexico, “Mexican history has seen oil transformed from a
badge of ‘foreign domination and interference’ to a symbol of ‘pride,
self-respect, and independence.’”159 The Mexican constitutional provi-
sions on energy announce the general principle that “ownership of the
lands and waters within the boundaries of the national territory is vested
in the Nation.”160 When Mexico applied to the GATT, its energy industry
became an issue in its accession negotiation in 1985–86.161 Mexico at-
tempted, but failed, to preclude any application of the GATT principles
to the energy industry during the deliberations on its accession due to
strong opposition from other contracting parties.162 The final Protocol of
Accession specifically states that:
Mexico will exercise sovereignty over natural resources, in ac-
cordance with the Political Constitution of Mexico. Mexico
may maintain certain export restrictions related to the conser-
vation of natural resources, particularly in the energy sector,
on the basis of its social and development needs if those ex-
port restrictions are made effective in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption.163
Mexico has gradually relaxed its restrictions on the exploration and pro-
duction of its natural resources since the late 1990s by reforming the op-
eration of its state-owned company—Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX).164
Nonetheless, this unique historical background has resulted in the reser-
vation declared by Mexico under NAFTA’s Energy Chapter.
2. Energy Chapter: Chapter 6 of NAFTA
There are nine provisions and five annexes within Chapter 6,
which is entitled “Energy and Basic Petrochemicals,” under NAFTA.
Compared to the lack of definition of “energy good” under the GATT
1994, Article 602.2 of NAFTA defines “energy goods” by listing those
158. Middleton, supra note 10, at 192–93.
159. English, supra note 153, at 2. For a detailed discussion on Mexico’s history of oil
from the colonial period to the 1990s, see id. at 2–7.
160. Id. at 7.
161. Id. at 9–12.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 13 (citing Protocol of Accession of Mexico to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, GATT Doc. L/6010; WTO, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 33rd Supp.
27, 1987).
164. English, supra note 153, at 6–7. R
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products under their Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
System (HS) codes.
Article 601.1 states that “[t]he Parties confirm their full respect of
their Constitutions.”165 Such a provision echoes the unique regulatory
background of the energy industry in Mexico. Article 603, “Import and
Export Restrictions,” is largely based on the relevant GATT 1994 provi-
sions and emphasized the prohibition or restrictions on energy trade.166
Article 603.2 prohibits the imposition of minimum import and export
prices, which were not explicitly stated in Article XI of the GATT. Article
603.2 also imposes prohibitions on maximum import and export prices,
which is not provided under the GATT.167 Article 603.5 provides: “Each
Party may administer a system of import and export licensing for energy
or basic petrochemical goods provided that such system is operated in a
manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including par-
agraph 1 and Article 1502 (Monopolies and State Enterprises).”
As for the export taxes, Article 604 applies both the most favored
nation and the national treatment principles to the imposition of export
taxes by requiring:
No party may adopt or maintain any duty, tax or other charge
on the export of any energy or basic petrochemical good to the
territory of another party, unless such duty, tax or charge is
adopted or maintained on: a) exports of any such good to the
territory of all other Parties; and b) any such good when des-
tined for domestic consumption.168
Article 605, “Other Export Measures,” permits the Party to maintain or
introduce restrictions permitted under Article XI:2(a) and XX(g), (i) and
(j) of the GATT only if three conditions are met. First, Article 605(a)
provides:
165. NAFTA, supra note 151, art. 601.1 R
166. NAFTA Article 603.1 states: “Subject to the further rights and obligations of this
Agreement, the Parties incorporate the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), with respect to prohibitions or restrictions on trade in energy and basic
petrochemical goods.” Id. art. 603.1.
167. GATT 1994, article XI:1 only states:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on
the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting
party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for
the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT 1994, supra note 55, art. XI:1. R
168. NAFTA, supra note 151, art. 604. R
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[T]he restriction does not reduce the proportion of the total export
shipments of a specific energy good made available to the other
Party relative to the total supply of that good of the Party main-
taining the restriction as compared to the proportion prevailing in
the most recent 36-month period for which data are available
prior to the imposition of the measure, or in such other repre-
sentative period on which the Parties may agree.”169
Second, Article 605(b) states that “the Party does not impose a higher price
for exports of an energy good to the other Party than the price charged for
such energy good when consumed domestically, by means of any measure
such as licenses, fees, taxation and minimum price requirements.”170
Third, Article 605(c) states that “the restriction does not require the disrup-
tion of normal channels of supply to the other Party or normal proportions
among specific energy goods supplied to the other Party such as, for exam-
ple, between crude oil and refined products and among different catego-
ries of crude oil and of refined products.”171 Articles XI:2(a) and XX(g), (i)
and (j) of the GATT 1994, as has been discussed in the previous section,
do not contain such conditions. Furthermore, these conditions provide
greater security of supply for the importing Party even when the export-
ing Party invokes these exceptions to impose export control measures.
Article 607, “National Security Measures,” provides security ex-
ceptions. Although modeled after Article XXI of the GATT 1994,172 the
definition of “security” offered in Article 607 is much narrower than that
offered in GATT and, therefore, reduces the scope for abuse of these pro-
visions at the cost of restricting their applicability. For example, Article
607 does not contain vague terms such as “essential security interests” or
“emergency in international relations” as provided under the GATT 1994
Article XXI. Article 607, instead, provides clearer conditions under which
national security measures can be adopted.173
169. Id. art. 605(a) (emphasis added).
170. Id. art. 605(b) (emphasis added).
171. Id. art. 605(c) (emphasis added).
172. NAFTA Article 607 states: “Subject to Annex 607, no Party may adopt or maintain
a measure restricting imports of an energy or basic petrochemical good from, or exports of
an energy or basic petrochemical good to, another Party under Article XXI of the GATT or
under Article 2102 (National Security). . . .” Id. art. 607 (emphasis added).
173. NAFTA Article 607 states:
[E]xcept to the extent necessary to: a) supply a military establishment of a
Party or enable fulfillment of a critical defence contract of a Party; b) re-
spond to a situation of armed conflict involving the Party taking the mea-
sures; c) implement national policies or international agreements relating
to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive de-
vices; or d) respond to direct threats of disruption in the supply of nuclear
materials for defence purposes.
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Annex 602.3 contains reservations made by Mexico. Basically,
Mexico reserves the following strategic activities, including investment
and the provision of services in various activities: (1) exploration, ex-
ploitation, refining or processing of crude oil and natural gas, and pro-
duction of artificial gas, and basic petrochemicals and their feed stocks
and pipelines; (2) foreign trade, transportation, and storage and distribu-
tion (up to and including the first-hand sales of crude oil, natural and
artificial gas, basic petrochemicals, and goods covered by the Energy
Chapter that were obtained from the refining or processing of crude oil
and natural gas); (3) supply of electricity as a public service in Mexico,
including the generation, transmission, transformation, distribution, and
sale of electricity; and, (4) handling of radioactive minerals and wastes.174
Annex 603.6 further provides that, for goods listed in this Annex, Mexico
“may restrict the granting of import and export licenses for the sole pur-
pose of reserving foreign trade in these goods to itself.” Annex 605 pro-
vides that Article 605, “Other Export Measures,” “shall not apply as
between the other Parties and Mexico.” Annex 607.1 also provides that
Article 607, “National Security Measures,” “shall impose no obligations
and confer no rights on Mexico.” “Mexico’s reservation of its energy sec-
tor to itself is clearly the most significant limitation of NAFTA’s provi-
sions on energy.”175 Despite these reservations under various Annexes,
Mexico still has to comply with Article 603—apart from the licensing
requirements—and Article 604, which provides the basic principles of
trade liberalization in energy and basic petrochemical goods. Clearly, the
most important consequence of the reservation is that foreign investment
in the Mexican petroleum industry will continue to be impossible as long
as Mexico maintains the reservation.176
To summarize, most of the provisions on the prohibition of export
controls and limited exception to such controls in trade in energy goods
in NAFTA’s Energy Chapter, in spite of Mexico’s reservation, are very
similar to, but more comprehensive than, those under the GATT 1994.
B. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
On March 2006, at a public hearing entitled “Green Paper on a
European Energy Policy,” Commissioner Piebalgs for DG-Energy and
Transport stated that the core energy objectives of the European Union
Id.
174. NAFTA, supra note 151, Annex 602.3, ¶ 1. R
175. English, supra note 153, at 14. R
176. Id. at 17–18.
\\server05\productn\N\NMN\49-2\NMN204.txt unknown Seq: 40 26-APR-10 15:18
472 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 49
(E.U.) are sustainability, competitiveness, and security of supply.177
Hence, future energy policy of the E.U. “will be based on seeking diversi-
fication of energy sources and increased use of locally developed en-
ergy.”178 To decrease its reliance on Middle East oil, Western Europe has
been trying to diversify the sources of its fuel supply. However, such a
move has resulted in increasing reliance on imported Russian natural
gas.179 Rather than mitigating Western Europe’s vulnerability to supply
disruption and price increases, such a result renders “Western Europe
more acutely exposed to interruptions in its energy supply than other
regions.”180 In particular, as the majority of Europe’s gas supplies are
transported via pipelines, Western European states are “at risk of strate-
gic behavior by Eastern European governments as it is difficult or impos-
sible to redeploy energy infrastructure if gas transit is interrupted or
stopped.”181 The controversy of the sudden cut-off of gas supplied by
Russia to Ukraine in January 2006 is a good case in point. “The [Energy
Charter Treaty] was, in part, designed to help buttress European energy
security in the face of these risks.”182
Based on the European Energy Charter (a political declaration that
was signed in The Hague in December 1991), negotiation on the ECT
took off in 1992. The ECT, together with its “Protocol on Energy Effi-
ciency and Related Environmental Aspects,” was opened for signature in
Lisbon in December 1994. The ECT came into effect on April 16, 1998.183
Fifty-two countries have signed the ECT and 47 signatories have ratified
it, including the E.U. and three non-European countries—Australia, Ja-
pan, and Mongolia. The Contracting Parties of the ECT adopted the
“Amendment to the Trade-Related Provisions of the Energy Charter
Treaty” (Trade Amendment) in April 1998.184
The main purpose of the Trade Amendment includes replacing
the references to the GATT provisions under the ECT with the relevant
WTO provisions and expanding the scope of trade regulations from “en-
177. Piebalgs Reviews Progress Towards European Energy Policy, E.U. FOCUS, 195, at 12
(2006).
178. Id. at 12; see also Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 10.1.2007; An
Energy Policy for Europe, COM, 1 final (2007).
179. Chris Flynn, Russian Roulette: The ECT, Transit and Western European Energy Secur-
ity, INT’L ENERGY L. & TAX’N REV. 12, 12 (2007).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 12.
182. Id.
183. THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, 34 I.L.M. 360 (1995) [hereinafter ECT]; see also About
the Charter, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7 (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
184. See the “Members & Observers” section in the “About the Charter” information
contained at the official website of the Energy Charter Treaty, http://www.encharter.org/
index.php?id=7 (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
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ergy materials and products” to “energy-related equipment[ ].”185 The ne-
gotiation of the ECT Transit Protocol began in 2000, but was ended by
the Contracting Parties in December 2002 because only three issues re-
mained unsettled at that time, for which there were differences only be-
tween the Russian and E.U. delegations.186 The E.U.-driven ECT is an
international agreement aimed to “create a freer and more competitive
energy market among its Contracting Parties through the establishment
of a negotiated discipline on the regulation of investment, transit and
trade in the energy sector”; the predominant features of the ECT are “in-
vestment protection and facilitation of transit.”187
With respect to trade, the ECT envisages that all its Contracting
Parties will become WTO Members. Relevant ECT trade provisions are
designed to be used in the interim period during which a few ECT Con-
tracting Parties are in the process of their WTO accession negotiation.
Thus, “with regard to the relationship between WTO Members inter se,
the ECT trade regime is simply the WTO trade regime.”188 The “[t]rade
relationship between ECT Contracting Parties one or more of which are
not WTO Members is also governed by WTO rules—but this time, ‘sub-
ject to some exceptions and modifications.’ Among these exceptions and
modifications, the [ECT’s] balance between export and import restric-
tions, in comparison to the WTO rules, is pertinent.”189
Article 1 provides the definition of “Energy Material and Prod-
ucts.” Annex EM lists three categories of “Energy Material and Prod-
ucts”: (1) nuclear energy; (2) coal, natural gas, petroleum and petroleum
products, and electrical energy; and (3) other energy. “Economic Activity
in the Energy Sector” is defined in Article 1, sub-paragraph 5 as “an eco-
nomic activity concerning the exploration, extraction, refining, produc-
tion, storage, land transport, transmission, distribution, trade, marketing,
or sale of Energy Materials and Products except those included in Annex
NI, or concerning the distribution of heat to multiple premises.”190 Article
4 reiterates the principle that relevant GATT rules are applicable within
185. See ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: A READER’S
GUIDE, 14–15, available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/
ECT_Guide_ENG.pdf.
186. Andrei A. Konoplyanik, Russia-EU Summit: The Energy Charter Treaty and the Issue
of Energy Transit, INT’L ENERGY L. & TAX’N REV. 30, 32 (2005); see also Doran Doeh, Russia
and the Energy Charter Treaty: Common Interests or Irreconcilable Differences, INT’L ENERGY L. &
TAX’N REV. 189, 190 (2006).
187. Desta et al., supra note 4, at 539. R
188. Id. at 539–40.
189. Id. at 540.
190. ECT, supra note 183, art. 1. R
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the ECT regime.191 Article 29, as replaced by Article 1 of the Trade
Amendment, sets down interim provisions on trade-related matters with
regard to those ECT Contracting Parties that are not yet WTO Members.
Article 29.2(a) states:
Trade in Energy Materials and Products and Energy-Related
Equipments between Contracting Parties at least one of which
is not a WTO Member shall be governed, subject to subpara-
graph (b) and to the exceptions and rules provided for in An-
nex W, by the provisions of the WTO Agreement, as applied
and practised with regard to Energy Materials and Products
and Energy-Related Equipment by Members of the WTO
among themselves, as if all Contracting Parties were Members
of the WTO.192
Take export control measures as an example. All regulations on export
controls under the GATT/WTO—as examined in the previous section—
are applicable to exportation of such products and equipment among the
ECT Contracting Parties, unless otherwise provided.
In comparison to NAFTA which focuses on quantitative restric-
tions, taxes, and other price-based restrictions, the following discussion
will demonstrate that Article 29 of the ECT, as replaced by Article 1 of
the Trade Amendment, puts more emphasis on customs duty or charges
of any kind imposed on, or in connection with, importation or exporta-
tion. Article 29.3 requires that, on the date of its signature or of its de-
posit of its instrument of accession, each signatory and each state, or
regional economic integration organization acceding to the ECT, shall
provide to the Secretariat a list of all import and export customs duties
and charges of any kind on Energy Materials and Products and Energy-
Related Equipment, and notify the Secretariat of any subsequent
changes.193
Article 29.4 further provides that Contracting Parties shall en-
deavor not to increase any export or import customs duty or charge of
any kind: (a) in the case of importation and if the Contracting Parties are
WTO Members, above the level set for in the Schedules of tariff conces-
sion of that Contracting Parties; and, (b) in the case of exportation and in
the case of importation with Contracting Parties that are not WTO Mem-
bers, above the level most recently notified to the Secretariat.194 In addi-
tion, Article 29.6 requires that, in respect to trade between Contracting
191. Note that references to the GATT are all being replaced by the WTO in the Trade
Amendment.
192. ECT, supra note 183, art. 29.2(a). R
193. Id. art. 29.3(a).
194. Id. art. 29.4(a), (b).
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Parties at least one of which is not a WTO Member, a Contracting Party
shall not increase any export or import customs duty or charge of any
kind above the lowest of the levels applied on the date of the decision by
the Charter Conference and must list the particular item in the relevant
Annex.195 As has been analyzed, obligations not to impose duties and
other charges higher than those prescribed in the Members’ Schedules
only apply to import under Article II.1(b) of the GATT 1994. In compari-
son, such obligation has been extended to export duties as well under the
ECT, which provides a more comprehensive legal regime concerning ex-
port duties and charges.
With regard to exceptions, Article 24 of the ECT provides general
and security exceptions similar to the approach, but not identical to the
conditions, of Articles XX and XXI of the GATT.196 Article 24.1, however,
states that “[t]his Article shall not apply to Articles 12, 13 and 29.”197 As a
result, the above-mentioned obligations concerning the imposition of
customs duties and charges on, or in connection with, importation and
exportation of Energy Materials and Products and Energy-Related
Equipment as stipulated under Article 29, cannot be exempted by invok-
ing Article 24. In other words, these obligations can only be exempted by
complying with the GATT provisions on exceptions, such as Article XX
and Article XXI.
In addition to these more comprehensive regulations concerning
export duties and charges under the GATT/WTO, the ECT provides an-
other set of rules which are crucial to energy security concerns but are
insufficiently regulated under the GATT/WTO; these are its rules on
transit. Despite the suspension of the negotiation on the Transit Protocol,
Article 7 of the ECT has already provided the basic obligations on transit
of energy materials and products, as the following analysis will demon-
strate. It has been argued that the GATT 1994 provision on transit, Arti-
cle V, stops short of addressing some fundamental issues that are
pertinent to transit of energy and that the ECT went a step further.198
Article 7.1 states:
Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary measures to
facilitate the Transit of Energy Materials and Products consis-
tent with the principle of freedom of transits and without dis-
195. Id. art. 29.6(a), (b).
196. ECT Article 24.2(b)(i) contains language similar to GATT 1994 Article XX(b): “nec-
essary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.” ECT Article 24.3(a)(ii) also contains
language similar to GATT 1994 Article XXI:(b)(iii): “taken in time of war . . . or other
emergency in international relations.”
197. ECT, supra note 183, art. 24.1. R
198. Laffont, supra note 27, at 240. R
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tinction as to the origin, destination or ownership of such
Energy Materials and Products or discrimination as to pricing
on the basis of such distinction, and without imposing any un-
reasonable delays, restrictions or charges.199
Article 7.2 states that Contracting Parties “shall encourage relevant enti-
ties to cooperate” in four types of measures, including “measures to miti-
gate the effects of interruptions in the supply of Energy Materials and
Products” and those “facilitating the interconnection of Energy Transport
Facilities.”200
In comparison, private entities are not regulated under Article V
of the GATT 1994. Article 7.2 of the ECT, thus, made a great improve-
ment in this aspect. Furthermore, Article 7.3 lays down the national treat-
ment principle with regard to the transport of Energy Materials and
Products and the use of Energy Transport Facilities. Another improve-
ment is that, in the event of a dispute over any matter arising from
transit, Article 7.6 requires that the Contracting Party through whose
Area Energy Materials and Products transit:
[S]hall not . . . interrupt or reduce, permit any entity subject to its
control to interrupt or reduce, or require any entity subject to its
jurisdiction to interrupt or reduce the existing flow of Energy
Materials and Products prior to the conclusion of the dispute reso-
lution procedures set out in paragraph (7), except where this is
specifically provided for in a contract or other agreement gov-
erning such Transit or permitted in accordance with the con-
ciliator’s decision.201
Several concerns and issues relating to transit, such as growing
dependence on imported energy, specific guidelines, criteria, or rules for
transit fees, have not been addressed in Article 7 and, hence, the need for
the Contracting Parties of the ECT to begin negotiating a Transit Proto-
col.202 However, compared to the inadequate regulation of transit under
the GATT 1994, Article 7 of the ECT alone seems to provide a better
protection for importing countries:
When comparing those who have signed and ratified with
those who have either not signed or not ratified, it is hard to
escape the inference that the ECT is regarded favourably by
countries which are primarily consumers, but that most pro-
199. ECT, supra note 183, art. 7.1. R
200. ECT, supra note 183, arts. 7.2(c)–(d). R
201. ECT, supra note 183, art. 7.6 (emphasis added). R
202. See Laffont, supra note 27, at 241–42; see also Walde & Gunst, supra note 17, at 213. R
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ducers [with few exceptions] have serious reservations about
it.203
Take Russia, the most important energy-exporting country, as an
example. Russia has signed the ECT, but has stated clearly that it would
not ratify the current ECT at the G8 Summit in July 2006.204 In this cir-
cumstance, Russia, in accordance with Article 45 of the ECT, only needs
to apply the ECT “provisionally pending its entry into force . . . to the
extent that such provisional application is not inconsistent with its con-
stitution, laws or regulations.” Russia has not delivered a declaration ac-
cording to Article 45.2(a) stating that “it is not able to accept provisional
application.”205 It also did not file a written notification according to Arti-
cle 45.3(a) to the Depository of its intention not to be become a Con-
tracting Party and thereby terminate its provisional application of this
Treaty.206 All these indicate that, although not yet a Contracting Party,
the ECT is currently applicable to Russia on a provisional basis.
In summary, provisions on trade and transit for energy materials
and goods, and energy-related equipments under the ECT provide more
comprehensive regulations on export control and transit than those
under the GATT/WTO. However, it also has to be noted that, instead of
its own exception clauses, exceptions to export control regulations in the
ECT are those under the GATT/WTO.
C. Regionalism Versus Multilateralism
The Energy Chapter, whose provisions were later on replicated in
the more general chapter on trade in goods, was among the first to be
negotiated during NAFTA negotiations.207 It is thus “reasonable to sup-
pose, then, that the detailed energy provisions of . . . NAFTA reflect to
an important extent the policy directions that the world’s major trading
nation wishes to pursue with respect to energy trade in other [forums]
such as the WTO.”208 Meanwhile, facing the increasing dependence on
203. Doeh, supra note 186, at 189. R
204. Russia clearly stated that its biggest concern on the ECT is the Transit Protocol. See
id. at 189–90.
205. ECT Article 45.2(a) states: “Notwithstanding paragraph (1) any signatory may,
when signing, deliver to the Depository a declaration that it is not able to accept provi-
sional application. The obligation contained in paragraph (1) shall not apply to a signatory
making such a declaration. Any such signatory may at any time withdraw that declaration
by written notification to the Depository.” ECT, supra note 183, art. 45.2(a). R
206. ECT Article 42.3(a) states: “Any signatory may terminate its provisional applica-
tion of this Treaty by written notification to the Depository of its intention not to become a
Contracting Party to the Treaty.” ECT, supra note 183, art. 42.3(a). R
207. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 63 (2000). R
208. Id.
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energy supply from Russia, the E.U. initiated and concluded the ECT
with an aim of strengthening the link with its major energy supplying
countries—in addition to speeding up Russia’s WTO accession negotia-
tion.209 As illustrated in this section, both NAFTA and the ECT base their
trade regulations on those under the GATT/WTO. However, NAFTA
and the ECT provide more comprehensive and detailed provisions on
export controls and transit to address energy security concerns of their
parties—in particular, importing parties.
There are several differences between the GATT/WTO, on one
hand, and NAFTA and the ECT, on the other hand. First, energy goods
are not subject to special or different treatment under the GATT/WTO.
NAFTA, however, has a whole chapter focusing on energy goods and
the ECT regime focuses exclusively on energy goods. Second, with re-
gard to export control via tariffs, the legal regime under the GATT/WTO
seems to provide asymmetrical treatment between import duties and ex-
port duties in terms of treaty language under Article II:1(b) of the GATT
1994. The ECT, on the other hand, provides a more balanced framework
in terms of requiring its Contracting Parties not to raise import and ex-
port duties and other charges without complying with relevant provi-
sions under Article 29.4. Furthermore, the imposition of export duties
does not need to comply with the national treatment principle under Ar-
ticle II of the GATT 1994, while the Energy Chapter under NAFTA—in
particular Article 603—provides that the imposition of export duties
needs to comply with both the most favored nation principle and the
national treatment principle.
Third, with regard to export control via quantitative restrictions,
the legality of maximum export price remains uncertain under the
GATT/WTO while the Energy Chapter under NAFTA specifically pro-
hibits such practice in Article 603.2. Fourth, with regard to exceptions to
export control measures, the exception clauses under Article 605 of the
NAFTA provide more stringent disciplines in the event of invoking such
exceptions than Article XI and Article XX of the GATT. Lastly, with re-
spect to transit, Article V of the GATT 1994 provides a fairly limited set
of regulations and some scholars even argue that it is still debatable
whether Article V applies to the transit of energy at all.210 In addition,
considering the prevailing practices in the energy industry—where pipe-
lines are mostly constructed and managed by state-owned or monopo-
lized enterprises—the inapplicability of Article V on private entities
further illustrates its inadequacy in dealing with transit in energy trade.
209. Russia applied for accession to the WTO in June 1993. ECT began its negotiations
in 1992 and opened for signature in 1994.
210. Laffont, supra note 27, at 240. R
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The ECT, despite the suspension of its negotiation on the Transit Proto-
col, still provides a more complete set of regulations compared to Article
V of the GATT.
As Part II of this article has previously pointed out, issues critical
to energy trade, such as investment measures and competition policies,
are not directly regulated under the current GATT/WTO framework.
The inadequacy of the GATT 1994 provisions on export control measures
has also been pointed out in Part III of this article. However, the discus-
sion in this Part, so far, indicates that regional agreements such as
NAFTA and the ECT provide a better legal framework to address their
parties’ energy security concerns—in particular, the security of supply,
by prescribing more comprehensive regulations on export control mea-
sures and transit. Does this suggest that the GATT/WTO plays a dimin-
ishing role in the international trade in energy from the perspectives of
its Members’ energy security concerns?
First, the main purpose of the WTO is the liberalization of trade in
goods in general, rather than in specific sectors. Sector-specific regula-
tions—such as the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on
Textile and Clothing—do exist under the WTO but, rather than creating
different sets of rules, their primary focus is to normalize trade relations
in a specific group of goods that were previously subject to different
rules. This normalization of trade relations was implemented so that spe-
cific goods under different rules could be “brought back” to the general
framework of trade provisions under the WTO and common to trade in
goods in all sectors. From another perspective, the legal framework
under the WTO does not exclude any specific sector.
It is possible that different types of trade barriers exist in different
sectors and for different goods. The main objective of the GATT 1947, as
well as the WTO, is to provide a broad legal framework to eliminate as
many types of trade barriers as possible.211 As a result, legal obligations
for WTO Members under the GATT/WTO should, in theory, apply to
trade in goods and services in all sectors. The energy sector, therefore,
should not be excluded from the GATT/WTO. From the energy security
needs of WTO Members that depend on imported energy, however, the
traditional market-access emphasis of the GATT/WTO does not seem to
meet their need for security of supply. It cannot be denied that previous
negotiation rounds in the GATT 1947, as well as the 2004 Doha Round in
the WTO, have focused and are still focusing on eliminating trade barri-
ers for “import” rather than “export.”
This has resulted in an unbalanced regulatory framework in
which export controls are treated less extensively than import controls.
211. See the preamble to the WTO Agreement and the preamble to the GATT 1947.
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From the supply security concerns of certain, if not the majority, of the
WTO Members, it is not surprising that legal framework under the WTO
is incapable of meeting such needs. Nevertheless, from the discussion of
this article, export control via export duties can be subject to tariffs re-
duction negotiations and be incorporated in Members’ Schedules in such
a way as to guarantee sufficient certainty as provided under Article
II:1(a). In particular, some of the major energy resource exporting coun-
tries, such as Russia and the four OPEC members that are not yet WTO
Members, are currently in their accession negotiation phase. Negotiation
on the reduction of export tariffs on energy resources might play a signif-
icant role from this perspective.
For the following reasons, however, the multilateral trade provi-
sions under the GATT/WTO cannot fully address its Members’ security
concerns. First, the legality of production quota, adopted by OPEC coun-
tries, under the GATT/WTO remains uncertain. Second, considering the
characteristics of energy resources and their strategic importance, export-
ing Members have better chances of invoking exceptions provided under
the GATT/WTO—in particular, exceptions for Article XX and Article
XXI. Third, transit provisions under Article V of the GATT 1994 do seem
inadequate for certain energy goods, such as natural gas and electricity.
Because of these reasons, some WTO Members chose to resort to regional
agreements that can be more tailored to their energy security needs, as
illustrated in the cases of NAFTA and the ECT. Thus, to a certain extent,
regional agreements do replace the MTS of the WTO in addressing some
Members’ energy security concerns.
Indeed, regional agreements with fewer stakeholders offer more
flexibility in terms of prescribing and revising their regulations, which
seems to provide an attractive alternative for WTO Members that need
stricter export controls regulations to ensure access to supply. Such
Members can freely choose their partners in negotiating and concluding
regional agreements. In addition, as regional agreements involve fewer
countries, the trade-off that needs to be made in the process of further
liberalization on a reciprocal basis could be much smaller, giving rise to
reduced impact on the relevant domestic industries, and resulting in less
domestic opposition in concluding such agreements.212 However, the
most important aspects of such a regional approach is whether the
targeted exporting countries are willing to negotiate and conclude bilat-
eral or regional agreements with importing countries and, if they are,
will such agreements contain provisions more advantageous to import-
212. For example, importing countries could offer market access to petrochemicals or
other manufacturing products to exporting countries in exchange for exporting countries’
commitment of a steady supply of energy resources.
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ing countries? As observed by Selivanova: “[E]nergy-endowed states ap-
pear to be apprehensive about opening their energy sector through
international agreements.”213 From this perspective, the cases of NAFTA
and the ECT are the exceptions rather than the norms.214
Among the 153 WTO Members—the majority of which are depen-
dent on importing energy—how many of them enjoy power and hold
resources as influential as those of the European Union and the United
States to “convince” energy resource-rich countries to negotiate and con-
clude regional agreements that are tailored to the needs of importing
parties? As Part IV.A has illustrated, even for the United States, negotia-
tions under the Energy Chapter in NAFTA encountered great difficulties
due to the historically unique role of the energy industry in Mexico. Part
IV.B has also demonstrated that, for the European Union, the negotiation
on the Transit Protocol under the ECT had to be suspended due to strong
opposition from Russia, itself a powerful player.
From the analysis in Part II, energy security presents different pol-
icy concerns for countries with different characteristics and needs, which
also brings out different dimensions and policy concerns in energy trade.
In contrast to most of the regional agreements, the membership in the
WTO is fairly large and issues addressed under the WTO cover a wide
range of policies. Each country can, of course, opt for regional agree-
ments in addressing its special energy security needs. However, as coun-
tries transform through different phases of development, their energy
security needs and policy concerns in energy trade might also modify to
adjust to such transformation. As a result, each country might need to
consider as many energy security concerns as possible in its long-term
planning.
With respect to the various types of policies pertinent to different
countries’ energy security concerns, as identified in Part II.A, the WTO
seems to be the only global regime that covers almost all of these poli-
cies. Under such circumstances, the variety of policy concerns regulated
under the WTO legal framework seem to be the only international plat-
form which can provide a wide range of interests available to each Mem-
ber so that trade-off, in particular in each negotiation round, can be more
easily calculated to address contemporary and future policy needs. For
example, as previously analyzed in Part II.B.1, countries with abundant
energy resources and countries with advanced technologies have differ-
213. Yulia Selivanova, The WTO and Energy: WTO Rules and Agreements of Relevance to
the Energy Sector, ICTSD PROGRAMME ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT ISSUE PAPER NO. 1, 10
(2007), available at http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/05/the20wto20and20energy.pdf.
214. Indeed, as noted by Selivanova, “[f]ree trade agreements rarely contain provisions
specific to the energy sector.” Id. at 9.
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ent market access needs. Their different needs can both be satisfied
under the WTO via tariff reduction and/or service negotiation, resulting
in meeting different energy security concerns.
Furthermore, over-reliance on the regional approach might, in the
long run, impede a country’s capabilities to address evolving policy con-
cerns. For example, when an energy importing country concludes a re-
gional agreement with its main exporting partner with the intention of
securing energy supply, it might steadily increase energy resources im-
port from that particular country. This might reduce the level of diversi-
fication of energy supply and increase over-dependence on a single
energy supply, endangering its energy security objective. In addition, an-
other drawback of dealing with energy issues regionally is “the uncer-
tainty for newcomers in the market and possible inconsistency of these
rules with [those under the GATT/WTO].”215 For those policies that have
yet to be addressed, such as investment and competition policies and
those provisions that have yet to be clarified or strengthened—e.g., ex-
port regulations, freedom of transit, energy service, and state-owned en-
terprises under the GATT/WTO—regional agreements do play a
significant role in filling such a policy or legal vacuum.
Nonetheless, regional agreements involve a smaller group of
countries, and, most importantly, are not a viable alternative to most
WTO Members who do not hold strong enough bargaining power to en-
gage in such an approach. Consequently, for WTO Members that depend
on imported energy, the WTO legal framework might be the only availa-
ble multilateral forum to address their energy security concerns. As a
result, the role of the GATT/WTO in energy trade and energy security
cannot, and will not, be replaced by regional agreements.
As analyzed in Part II and Part III, the GATT/WTO framework
does exhibit its flaw in addressing Members’ energy security needs.
However, this should not be the only yardstick in evaluating the value
and function of the WTO, as energy security is not the objective of this
organization. The reform of the WTO and the evolution of its legal
framework cannot be undertaken only with the aim of maintaining en-
ergy security concerns and security of energy supply. Nevertheless, en-
ergy security reflects a wide range of policy concerns and such policy
contents contribute to the overall objective of trade liberalization. Fur-
thermore, regulations on export control and freedom of transit have
great impact, not only in energy trade, but also on trade in goods and
services in general. More symmetrical regulations on import and export,
as well as on providing greater freedom of transit, play an important
part in the liberalization of trade in other sectors. Accordingly, despite its
215. Id. at 13.
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importance, the regional approach should supplement, not substitute,
the multilateral approach under the GATT/WTO in addressing Mem-
bers’ energy security concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
The article set out to answer the following question: Will the role
of the MTS, established by the GATT/WTO, be increasingly marginal-
ized and replaced by regional agreements with regard to energy trade
and energy security concerns? After examining the concept of energy se-
curity and the different dimensions and policy-concerns of energy trade,
Part II identified export control regulations—including export tariffs,
quantitative restrictions on export, and certain exceptions to export con-
trol measures—as the most relevant legal rules under the GATT/WTO
in terms of energy security concerns. Part III conducted a detailed analy-
sis on such legal rules and concluded that the export control regulations
under the GATT/WTO provide insufficient protection for WTO Mem-
bers against export control measures on energy resources, mainly due to
the wide range of exceptions to these control measures available under
the GATT/WTO.
Part IV took up the issue of regional agreements, using NAFTA
and ECT as two examples, to examine whether such agreements provide
a more stable regime for WTO Members in terms of energy security con-
cerns. Part IV concluded that, in comparison to the GATT/WTO, both
regional agreements provide more adequate legal protection for their
parties, in terms of export control and transit regulations, under their
respective treaty. However, from the negotiation histories and current
development under these two regional agreements, the inequality
among its parties in terms of bargaining power stood out. In other
words, not every importing country has the power and influence of the
United States and the European Union to conclude a similar regional
agreement that will secure their supply of key energy resources. Further-
more, trade liberalization embodied in the GATT/WTO plays an impor-
tant role in energy trade.
Consequently, despite its insufficiency in providing legal protec-
tion and certainty to its Members for their energy security concerns,
other trade rules under the GATT/WTO play a no less significant role in
tailoring to the different needs of WTO Members’ energy security and
energy trade concerns. Such a role cannot be easily replaced by regional
agreements with a narrower focus. Export control measures, identified
and examined in this paper, are themselves subject to review and possi-
ble revision under the GATT/WTO due to the asymmetries between
export and import inherent in the GATT regime. Now that their
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importance in safeguarding WTO Members’ energy security is firmly es-
tablished, consensus should be easier to reach among Members for fu-
ture negotiations on strengthening the discipline of export controls in the
WTO.
